University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

2019

Silence and the Second Wall
Ming H. Chen
University of Colorado Law School

Zachary New
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Immigration Law
Commons, Law and Society Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the President/Executive
Department Commons

Citation Information
Ming H. Chen and Zachary New, Silence and the Second Wall, 28 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 549 (2019),
available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1240.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

Chen Book Proof (Do Not Delete)

8/15/2019 5:39 PM

SILENCE AND THE SECOND WALL
MING H. CHEN* AND ZACHARY NEW**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Trump administration has made its clarion call “build the wall.”1
From the start of the presidential campaign to the government shutdown to
the declaration of a national emergency, he has made the wall the centerpiece
of his immigration enforcement strategy. Opposition to the first wall has been
strong, ranging from street protests to the marbled halls of Congress. Indeed,
as of this writing, President Trump vetoed the House and Senate joint
resolutions to repudiate the White House declaration of a national emergency
at the border, after an extended fight over appropriations. While public
attention has been riveted on these dramatic episodes at the southern border
of the U.S., many more subtle challenges to legal migration have been
introduced and implemented. Collectively, these constitute a second wall.
This second wall is invisible to the public eye and has garnered little attention
from immigration advocates or policy reformers. To the extent advocates and
reformers have even noticed, their strategies to suspend the second wall have
been slight. This essay seeks to expose the features of the second wall, to
explain the silence surrounding it, and to propose strategies for countering it.
The second wall exists in several senses. First, the second wall blocks
out legal immigrants, rather than the border crossers who contend with the
first wall. The Trump administration’s most visible priorities have been
Central American asylum-seekers who cross the U.S.-Mexico border without
documentation. Restricting their entry entails a physical barrier. The second
wall has a broader target and consists of more varied impediments. The
second wall is constructed against legal immigrants. It impedes families
seeking to unite, employers seeking to sponsor workers for their businesses,
and refugees or military service members taking the next steps in their
journey toward becoming citizens. The imposition of barriers includes
procedural hurdles, such as intensified vetting and heightened scrutiny of
petitions, more requests for evidence, and new interview requirements. Like
the first wall barriers, these second wall barriers keep families apart,
disadvantage noncitizen workers, and render vulnerable immigrants in need
of humanitarian benefits. The second wall creates uncertainty in the
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1.
President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the National Security and
Humanitarian Crisis on our Southern Border, White House (Feb. 15, 2019), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-national-security-humanitariancrisis-southern-border/.
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immigration process for those who have traditionally felt secure in the
passage.
Second, while the Trump administration’s aggressive immigration
enforcement efforts center on building a wall at the U.S.-Mexico border, they
now also follow legal immigrants into the interior and block their integration
into American society. A variety of administrative practices govern
immigrants in matters of settlement or the quotidian details of their daily
lives—work, housing, schools, and social affairs—and constitute a more
abstract form of a wall than the barriers to immigrating. Many of these
policies are esoteric and may even seem mundane. However, once
immigrants have crossed borders to arrive in the U.S., the Department of
Homeland Security is limiting their ability to obtain green cards and to
naturalize; some naturalized citizens cower in fear of denaturalization. In
other words, the border mentality extends beyond initial entry to follow
immigrants into the process of settlement.
The bundle of changes to immigration policy manifests in the
immigration bureaucracy. In particular, many of the agency practices and
policies that we are calling the second wall have built a bureaucratic barrier
that is hard to see, understand, and redress. The same is true for changes in
other agencies of the immigration bureaucracy, whether in the immigration
courts, where immigration judges can no longer grant continuances while
applications for relief from removal trudge through the bureaucracy, or in
ICE, where officers no longer exercise discretion in humanitarian cases that
had been deprioritized under prior administrations. Collectively, these
changed agency procedures and policies create intensifying procedures for
immigration benefits and shifts in policy toward substantive goals that
compete with the provision of immigrant services. The toll can be seen in
unprecedented backlogs and long wait times. Evidence abounds that these
policies are having an impact on many quarters of life inside the U.S.: the
number of H-1B skilled worker petitions declined, international student
enrollment is falling, tourism is down, and immigrants are choosing to stay
away from the U.S. The “administration has adopted dozens of policies and
procedures that are slowing, or even stopping legal immigration.”2 So while
the border wall embodies a physical barrier, it can also be viewed as a social
construction. Understanding the wall in this way transforms the border wall
from being a tangible marker of divisions to being a symbol of
bureaucratizing forces excluding legal immigrants.
Opposition to the first border wall has been strident: from clamoring at
the U.S.-Mexico border over mounting obstacles to Central American
migrants seeking asylum, to street protests outside Congress and courthouses
and churches over ICE raids, to hunger strikes in detention facilities over
conditions of confinement. Cumulatively these strategies have created a
sanctuary movement to protect undocumented immigrants from federal
enforcement. Opposition to the second wall has been quiet by comparison.
There has not been a broad public disapproval with the aims of second wall
policies, nor the mobilization of a sanctuary movement that empowers local
2.
AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, DECONSTRUCTING THE INVISIBLE WALL: HOW POLICY
CHANGES BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ARE SLOWING AND RESTRICTING LEGAL IMMIGRATION 3
(2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-report-deconstructing-the-invisible-wall.
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communities to stand up for legal immigrants. Using institutional and policy
analysis, the essay explores the distinctive challenges posed to legal
migration by the second wall and the difficulty of countering them through
traditional means of resistance. One complication with opposing the second
wall is its invisibility or obscurity, which makes it difficult to fully
comprehend the nature of the challenge or the reach of its consequences.
Complexity makes it difficult to counter the policies. A lack of transparency
makes it difficult to appeal to the institutions responsible for holding
immigration policymakers accountable.
Part I provides some background on legal migration and the immigration
bureaucracy. Part II explains the characteristics of second wall policies and
provides extensive examples. Part III turns to the emerging challenges to the
second wall and analyzes their promise and deficits. Part IV concludes with
suggestions on how to restore the federal government’s mission of serving
immigrants and proposes a multi-pronged strategy for scaling the second
wall.
II.

BACKGROUND ON LEGAL MIGRATION

For the past 30 years, U.S. immigration policy has focused on federal
enforcement against undocumented immigrants, so-called criminal aliens,
and suspected foreign terrorists. Discussions of changes to legal migration
have come up from time to time, but without comprehensive immigration
reform from Congress there has been no real action to change the architecture
of legal migration. The 1952 McCarren Walter Act is still the edifice of the
modern framework of immigration law that includes employer-based,
family-sponsored, diversity, and humanitarian visas as the vehicles for legal
admissions. This is changing under the Trump Administration, whose
immigration policy is so expansive that it has reached new targets and
enlisted new actors.
The federal government’s immigration apparatus is concentrated in the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a behemoth department
forged after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that is comprised of
88 units who claim responsibility for some aspect of national security. 3 The
enforcement components of the agency, the Immigration and Customs and
Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have been
the vanguard of modern immigration policy. By comparison, the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) is small. USCIS is the
immigrant-serving component of the federal immigration bureaucracy.
Whereas ICE and CBP primarily contend with undocumented immigrants,
USCIS handles most matters concerning legal immigrants: entry visas and
immigration benefits for temporary visitors, asylum-seekers, and
immigrants; green cards for employers, workers, and families seeking to
unify; and naturalized citizenship for those who are eligible. The agency
makes adjudicative decisions at service centers and manages all immigration
benefit functions that do not relate to enforcement. It is separated from ICE
and CBP by institutional design as a way to bolster agency independence and
3.

Opinion, 88, Count ‘Em, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, at A18.
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improve customer service toward noncitizens. Yet ceasing to process these
immigration benefits in a timely fashion and adopting new initiatives that
cast a suspicious eye on legal migrants signals that changes at USCIS are
central to understanding second wall policies.
A.

ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY: FROM ENFORCEMENT TO
IMMIGRATION SERVICES AND BACK

Service to legal immigrants is not confined to USCIS. Other agencies
involved in legal immigration include the State Department, U.S.
Department of Labor, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. The State Department handles visa applications abroad and
recommends levels of yearly refugee admissions. The Departments of Labor
and Health and Human Services certify the fitness of immigrants for entry
and that the terms of their entry will not pose an economic threat to American
taxpayers and workers. Congress establishes ceilings for family-sponsored
immigration and diversity visas. However, among the several agencies that
are involved in immigration regulation, USCIS is the primary agency tasked
with legal immigration and has gone through the most dramatic
transformations in the implementation of its statutory mission.
As a key component of the immigration bureaucracy responsible for
legal migration, USCIS has over 200 offices around the world and employs
roughly 19,000 employees.4 It is situated in the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, and it performs a variety of functions. It focuses
especially on processing petitions and applications for immigrant benefits,
including petitions related to three key points on the immigrant's journey
towards civic integration: lawful entry on nonimmigrant or immigrant visas,
adjusting between statuses, including from temporary to permanent resident
status (LPR or green card), and naturalizing as a U.S. citizen. It also handles
asylum and refugee claims, employment authorizations, services related to
enforcement of immigration workplace laws, such as e-Verify for workplace
authorization or SEVIS for certification of international students, and
services related to immigrant integration, such as administration of the
Immigrant Integration Grants Program and Citizenship Resource Center.5
Prior to the creation of USCIS as an agency within the Department of
Homeland Security, immigration benefits and enforcement were handled for
70 years within the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS
operated as a unit within the U.S. Department of Justice from 1940-2003,
and was concerned with stemming the flow of immigrants following the
nation-building of the world wars. From 1933-1940, the U.S. Department of
Labor also assisted in regulating immigration, and was primarily concerned
with protecting American workers.6 Prior to 1933, there were separate
4.
WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44038, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES (USCIS) FUNCTIONS AND FUNDING 2 (2015). The size and scale of USCIS as part of DHS has
expanded since 2017 in the Trump Administration.
5.
These functions are noted in multiple sources. The USCIS function of encouraging immigrant
integration is noted in MICHAEL LEMAY, HOMELAND SECURITY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 68 (ABCCLIO ed. 2018).
6.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ORGANIZATIONAL TIMELINE, https://www.uscis.
gov/history-and-genealogy/our-history/organizational-timeline (last updated Feb. 4, 2016). For more
history, see KANDEL, supra note 4, at 1–2,16–18; OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, USCIS HIST. OFF. & LIBR.
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federal offices administering immigration matters, known as the Bureau of
Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization respectively, and an emphasis
on nation-building. The INS was established on June 10, 1933 to merge these
previously separate areas of administration.7 As immigration waned and
restriction increased following World War II, the consolidated services
shifted their focus back toward enforcement. The result was a tension
between enforcement and admission made more complicated by crosscutting laws governing immigrants’ rights and the shifting balance of power
between the federal government’s headquarters and regional field offices.
Negotiating these themes continued throughout the century.
For example, there were several notable instances of agency functions
changing to reflect the evolving relationship between immigration services
and border control between 1930 and 1980. As Professor Deborah Kang
notes in her history of the INS, the INS interacted with border patrol
throughout its early history through an informal patchwork of policies and
practices to balance enforcement with the entry and employment objectives
of border communities. These interactions rendered the INS a policymaking
body, not merely a law enforcement body. It initiated a process of negotiating
immigrant services and enforcement that continues into more
institutionalized forms today. A straightforward example arises in 1932,
when Congress proposed to consolidate immigration service and border
patrol by using repatriation instead of deportation at the border.8 A more
complex example arose in 1944, when the Bracero Program changed border
crossing protocols in a manner that reflected the federal agency’s struggle to
balance the goals of enabling seasonal agricultural work, closing the U.S.Mexico border, and honoring good neighbor policies post-world war.9 While
each of these incidents focused on the border, they are emblematic of broader
challenges to balance immigration enforcement with immigrant services.
Throughout the 1980-1990s period of expanded immigration
enforcement, the INS came under intense criticism for organizational
mismanagement. Though there were many factors, a good deal of the
dysfunction resulted in part from the unresolved tensions between
administering benefits and pursuing removal. The long-simmering tension
boiled over in the scenario where an individual denied an immigration
benefit—say an application for a green card—could be taken down the hall
to the enforcement division that would begin removal proceedings. Or an
undocumented parent might be reluctant to take a child who is eligible for
an immigration benefit in for their scheduled immigration appointment, for
fear of themselves being caught.10
(2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/History%20and%20Genealogy/Our%20History
/INS %20History/INSHistory.pdf.
7.
S. DEBORAH KANG, THE INS ON THE LINE: MAKING IMMIGRATION LAW ON THE US-MEXICO
BORDER, 1917–1954, at 65–67 (2017). See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (abolishing the INS).
8.
KANG, supra note 7, at 66.
9.
Id. See generally KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM,
IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (2010).
10.
See Nina Rabin, Searching for Humanitarian Discretion in Immigration Enforcement:
Reflections on a Year as an Immigration Attorney in the Trump Era, MICH. J. L. REFORM (forthcoming
2019); Interview with David Martin, former INS senior official and Emeritus Professor, University of
Virginia Law School (July 6, 2016) (on file with author).
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In the aftermath of September 11, these ruptures split apart the muchmaligned agency into separate enforcement divisions.11 A 9/11 Commission
Report pointed out organizational problems that made possible the terrorist
attacks. Key among these findings was that 15 of the 19 suspected terrorists
entered on visas that could have been barred, if more stringently vetted
beforehand.12 In the broad reorganization of immigration agencies and the
creation of the DHS, these longstanding criticisms drove the separation of
the two services into discrete agencies. In accordance with the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, enforcement split between CBP and ICE inside the
DHS, as it also did between DHS and the U.S. Department of Justice’s
Executive Office of Immigration Review, Bureau of Immigration Appeals,
and litigation offices. Within DHS, immigration benefits were consolidated
away from enforcement functions—within USCIS.13 The restructuring
reflected a worthwhile aspiration to separate enforcement and service
functions, a principle that remains an aspirational goal even if it is not always
carried out in practice.
B.

BALANCING ENFORCEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN THE MODERN
IMMIGRATION BUREAUCRACY

Once USCIS became an independent agency from ICE and CBP in 2003,
its institutional weaknesses and limited capacity to pursue these objectives
were revealed. It was the smallest and least funded of the agencies, with 95%
of its budget coming from an Immigration Examination Fee Account that
relied, and still relies, on fees paid directly by immigrant applicants to
minimize the burden of immigration benefits on U.S. taxpayers, and only 5%
from Congressional appropriations.14 It consistently ran into backlogs and
suffered long processing times.15 Its processes and technologies were out of
date. One insider called it the step-sister of the other immigration agencies.
The irony of USCIS’s unusual funding structure, which is largely funded by
user fees rather than an annual budget appropriation, is that it is less
accountable to Congress.16 These known challenges—limited funding, high
cost to individual immigrants, poor customer service, slow processes and
outmoded technologies, and lack of accountability to Congress given its
11.
KANG, supra note 7, at 168; LEMAY, supra note 5, at 68; LISA M. SEGHETTI, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL31388, INS: RESTRUCTURING PROPOSALS FOR THE 107TH CONGRESS 16 (2003).
12.
NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U. S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 80–
82 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.
13.
KANG, supra note 7, at 172–73.
14.
KANDEL, supra note 4, at 1, 7. While self-funding can be a source of insulation from political
pressure in independent agencies, there is little evidence in the legislative history that agency
independence was the reason for making USCIS self-funded. For a general discussion of the merits selffunding, see Charles Kruly, Self-Funding and Agency Independence, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1733
(2013); cf. Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The
Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822 (2012)
(discussing methods of congressional control over agencies through funding).
15.
Between FY 2002 and FY 2010, Congress called on USCIS to reduce its backlog and provided
$570 million in direct appropriations for this purpose. The extent to which USCIS has successfully done
so is contested. Administrative changes and national/world affairs affect the number of applications filed
and that, in turn, affects the agency workload. That said, critics say that agency reclassifications of the
definition of backlog obscure the need for change that is apparent regardless of fluctuations in caseload,
e.g. the predictable rise before fee increases or presidential elections and less predictable responses to
changes in immigration law. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV. OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2–3,
11–12 (2007).
16.
Id. at 46–47; KANDEL, supra note 4, at Appendix A.
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financial independence from the Congressional budget—have left the
agency vulnerable in the face of intensified enforcement efforts in the two
decades since its creation.
Moreover, there are signs that a different balance is being struck between
enforcement and service. Immigration enforcement is not a single-pronged
goal in immigration policy. It occurs as one of several policy goals, including
the administration of basic services and benefits to immigrants that facilitate
their integration into American society. While integration and enforcement
are typically treated to a functional division of labor, where the local
government or nonprofit organizations are tasked with immigrant integration
while the federal government takes on immigration enforcement, the two
tasks are inextricably intertwined. The federal government retains
responsibility for providing certain immigration benefits, most notably
naturalization, in addition to ensuring fidelity to immigration law through its
adjudicative functions. USCIS’ mission of providing service to immigrants
is aligned with local community organizations involved in immigrant
integration in important ways, such as by providing grants to local libraries
engaged in citizenship-enhancing activities like classes on English and
citizenship, or sponsoring naturalization drives and citizenship ceremonies.
That is the integration side of the nexus. The enforcement side of the nexus
has until recently been implicit, but it is ever-present: screening applications
for immigration benefits, making adjudicative decisions about eligibility for
asylum at the service centers, and adjudicating petitions for non-immigrant
temporary workers. In the instances when an immigrant is deemed ineligible,
the benefit is denied. Whether the matter ends there or whether USCIS
reaches out to the enforcement minded components by issuing a Notice to
Appear (NTA) in immigration court is a discretionary decision. Local
sanctuary networks have pushed back against the federal government’s
efforts to amplify immigration enforcement and promoted norms of
inclusion and integration as a general matter, but far less around legal
migration.17
In addition, choices about the expenditure of resources and the
prioritization of programs is significantly impacted by choices in executive
enforcement discretion.18 The exercise of that discretion has shifted toward
vigorous front-line officers and a more skeptical bureaucratic culture
throughout DHS, including the USCIS.19
C.

CHANGING MISSION OF THE MODERN IMMIGRATION
BUREAUCRACY

Translating these norms of immigrant inclusion and integration into a
national immigration policy requires restoring the balance between
enforcement and integration. While enforcement and integration can be seen
as opposites, they are linked: enforcement of immigration laws preserves a
17.
Ming H. Chen, Sanctuary Networks and Integrative Enforcement, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1361, 1384 (2019).
18.
For one of several articles about immigration enforcement discretion, see generally Zachary
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014).
19.
Rabin, supra note 10, at 20–21 (describing heavy scrutiny, long delays, and low visibility
denials as part of shift in USCIS bureaucratic culture).
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space for legal immigration. Instead of enhancing integration at USCIS, there
is evidence of enforcement undermining integration. The most vivid
illustration of the need to shield federal integration is the Trump
Administration’s literal rewriting of USCIS’ mission statement to say:
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers the nation’s
lawful immigration system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by
efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits
while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our
values.20
Notably the new statement reorders the priority of its functions to emphasize
safeguarding the integrity of a lawful immigration system and securing the
homeland, instead of administering immigration benefits as primary
examples of how to honor nation’s values.21 The shifting priorities have led
to reassignments of staff and duties to fraud and denaturalization, with
consequences for the quality and quantity of benefits cases adjudicated. The
mission also deletes language saying that the U.S. is a nation of immigrants,
shifting the tenor of the agency toward fraudulent or otherwise unlawful
immigration and elevating the defensive posture of USCIS that then Director
Lee Francis Cissna has called a “sword and shield.”22
In addition, USCIS has shifted its focus away from customer service and
toward centralized administrative priorities. Help desk services for
immigrants and their attorneys routinely yield stock replies. Calls go
unreturned. Community stakeholder meetings are less frequent. While it has
always been underfunded compared to its counterpart agencies in DHS, the
agency has distinguished itself as being funded mostly through filing fees
rather than Congressional appropriations. While this fee structure has the
potential for strong accountability to the immigrants who seek out services,
the cost to the immigrants is becoming quite high. Also, it appears that funds
intended to be used for adjudicating immigrant benefits are being used to
implement central administration goals. Examples include enhanced vetting
procedures, staffing for enforcement operations within USCIS, and the
initiation of new programs to tighten the link between naturalization and
removal or between naturalization and denaturalization.23 While the use of
20.
About Us: USCIS Mission Statement, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last updated Mar. 6, 2018). The former mission, statement read: “USCIS
secures America's promise as a nation of immigrants by providing accurate and useful information to our
customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an awareness and understanding of
citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of our immigration system.” Andrew R. Arthur, USCIS Changes
Its Mission Statement, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Feb. 23, 2018) https://cis.org/Arthur/USCISChanges-Its-Mission-Statement.
21.
News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Director L. Francis Cissna on
New Agency Mission Statement (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscisdirector-l-francis-cissna-new-agency-mission-statement.
22.
Richard Gonzalez, America No Longer Nation of Immigrants, N.P.R. (Feb. 22, 2018, 6:18
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/22/588097749/america-no-longer-a-nation-ofimmigrants-uscis-says.
23.
See generally AILA Policy Brief: New USCIS Notice to Appear Guidance, AM. IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS ASS’N (July 17, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-policy-brief-new-uscis-notice-toappear [hereinafter AILA Policy Brief: New USCIS Notice]; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0050.1, UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND
ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO APPEAR (NTAS) IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE
ALIENS (June 28, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-

Chen Book Proof (Do Not Delete)

2019]

8/15/2019 5:39 PM

Silence and the Second Wall

557

NTAs or Notices of Intent to Deny (NOIDs) for benefit denials has been
permitted previously, it was historically not frequently used. It was instead
used infrequently only on occasions related to high priority cases.
The recent exclusionary emphasis of USCIS, what public administration
scholars have identified as “mission drift,”24 means that the offices handling
legal immigrants have become an extension of the physical wall at the U.S.Mexico border. Granted, the mission of serving immigrants is not pursued to
the exclusion of fidelity to immigration law. USCIS remains an agency with
the Department of Homeland Security and several substantive provisions of
the INA expressly seek to ensure compliance with immigration laws. As
USCIS Director Cissna has said, “I just feel a strong commitment to the law,
and to the rule of law . . . . None of the things that we’re doing . . . are guided
by any kind of malevolent intent.”25 A similar rule of law justification for the
more rigorous requirements associated with legal migration is given by
USCIS Spokesman Michael Bars who says “Each year, immigration benefits
are attainable for many law-abiding individuals legitimately seeking greater
opportunity, prosperity, and security as newly entrusted members of society,
and to this end USCIS takes great pride in helping these dreams become a
reality . . . Ensuring that individuals who are subject to removal are placed
in proceedings is fidelity to the law.”26
Whatever their motivation, these accumulated changes in citizenship and
immigration policy construct a second wall for immigrants at each stage of
their efforts to settle into their lives in the U.S. New and highly technical
procedures and policies have complex and sometimes insidious implications
within arcane immigration law. Changes to agency practice have reduced
transparency and hidden the impact of USCIS policies on legal immigration.
Changes to substantive policy prioritize American economic and national
security interests while harming vulnerable immigrant groups.

06-28-PM-602-0050.1-Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf. USCIS issued a total
of 91,711 NTAs in 2017 and 92,229 NTAs in 2016. Of those, 8 out of 10 were issued in cases where an
asylum seeker obtained a positive credible fear determination after an interview with an asylum officer.
In those cases, an NTA must be issued, under 8 CFR §208.30(f), to give the asylum seeker an opportunity
to present his or her case to an immigration judge. In FY 2013, 2014, and 2015, USCIS issued
approximately 56,000 NTAs each year. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., MONTHLY
CREDIBLE AND REASONABLE FEAR NATIONALITY REPORTS (2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/FY18CFandRFstats_2018_06_30.pdf.
24.
As Margo Schlanger once said, being submerged in a broader agency dilutes the purpose. See
generally Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2014). Political scientist Marissa Golden has said that single-mission agencies tend
to be more zealous than those with mixed missions. See generally MARISSA GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES
BUREAUCRATS? POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS (2000). And that was the
point: following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service
was reformed to separate the benefit and enforcement functions, but it kept USCIS and ICE both within
DHS where intra-agency cooperation is all too easy and principles of the internal separation of powers
can be defeated. For more research on mission drift, see generally Alnoor Ebrahim et al., The Governance
of Social Enterprises: Mission Drift and Accountability Challenges in Hybrid Organizations, 34 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 81 (2014); Marshall Jones, The Multiple Sources of Mission Drift, 36
NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 299 (2007). Nina Rabin writes specifically about shifts in USCIS
bureaucratic culture in Rabin, supra note 10.
25.
Ted Hesson, The Man Behind Trump’s Invisible Wall, POLITICO (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/09/20/uscis-director-lee-francis-cissna-profile-220141.
26.
Amanda Holpuch, Trump’s Invisible Wall: How His 2018 Immigration Policies Built a
Barrier, GUARDIAN (Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/25/trump-wallimmigra tion-policies-mexico-border.
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CASE STUDIES OF THE SECOND WALL

This section sets out case studies of where administrative agencies pose
barriers to legal migration—in effect, instituting a second wall or
bureaucratic barrier to immigrants. As the case studies show, the bundle of
policies and practices is consequential for the ability of immigrants to obtain
lawful status and to integrate into American society. In addition, the policies
become a construct that deters immigrants from trying and reifies the sense
that they are outsiders even while living inside the U.S. Second wall policies
fall into three major categories: those policies erecting new and burdensome
procedural hurdles that massively increase the costs of legal migration, those
changes in agency practice that have reduced transparency and obfuscated
the impact that new agency policies have had on legal immigration, and new
shifts in substantive priorities that result in changing policies favoring
national security and merit based migration over long-established pathways.
A.

CREATION OF PROCEDURAL HURDLES TO LEGAL MIGRATION

A variety of second wall policies have made it increasingly difficult for
one applying for a legal immigration benefit to complete the process. New
procedural hurdles concerning the handling of evidence, referral of
immigrants to removal proceedings, calculation of unlawful presence, and
refusal to give deference to prior adjudications impose costs on immigrants
personally, financially, and temporally.
One such policy relates to the way USCIS treats evidence submitted with
petitions. During the summer of 2018, USCIS issued a new policy
memorandum regarding when the agency will issue Requests for Evidence
(RFEs) or Notices of Intent to Deny (NOIDs) in cases where an adjudicator
determines that an applicant has not submitted sufficient evidence to
establish eligibility for a benefit. Previous policy essentially held that unless
there was an issue with statutory eligibility, an adjudicator would seek
additional evidence from an applicant before denying a petition. The prior
policy stated that an adjudicator should issue an RFE or NOID where
evidence is insufficient to establish eligibility for relief sought unless there
was “no possibility that additional information or explanation will cure the
deficiency.”27 Under the new policy, “USCIS in its discretion may deny the
benefit request for failure to establish eligibility based on lack of required
initial evidence.”28 This new policy applies to all applications, petitions, and
requests received after the effective date.29 This includes all green card and
naturalization applications. This policy means that now some cases will be
closed as a matter of course, without an opportunity for the applicant to
correct minor mistakes. Even if the immigrant can refile, there will be added
costs: over $1,000 in the case of an application for a green card, and
increased delay. Compounding these evidentiary issues is a policy that
27.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., REQUESTS FOR EVIDENCE AND NOTICES OF
INTENT TO DENY 2 (June 3, 2013), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/
2013/June%202013/Requests%20for%20Evidence%20%28Final%29.pdf.
28.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0163, ISSUANCE
OF CERTAIN RFES AND NOIDS; REVISIONS TO ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL (AFM) CHAPTER 10.5(A),
CHAPTER 10.5(B) 3 (July 13, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/
AFM_10_Standards_for_RFEs_and_NOIDs_FINAL2.pdf.
29.
Id.
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eliminates the prior practice of affording deference to prior adjudicatory
decisions for purposes of extensions of nonimmigrant status.30
Adding to this, in a policy memorandum issued June 28, 2018, USCIS
was directed to begin issuing Notices to Appear (NTA), the charging
document that initiates removal proceedings, in drastically more expansive
scenarios.31 While USCIS is statutorily authorized to issue NTAs, policy has
long been to prioritize agency resources on “cases that involve public safety
threats, criminals, and aliens engaged in fraud.”32 As the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service General Counsel Sam Bernsen explained, an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, that is, the choice not to initiate removal
proceedings against an individual, is normally most appropriate “prior to the
institution of proceedings . . . it makes little sense to put an alien through the
ordeal and expense of a deportation proceeding when his actual removal will
not be sought.”33
Under the new policy, which USCIS has started to implement as of
October 1, 2018,34 those circumstances warranting the initiation of removal
proceedings have been greatly expanded, to include situations where, “upon
the issuance of an unfavorable decision on an application, petition, or benefit
request, the alien is not lawfully present in the United States.”35 This policy
shift will greatly increase the risk an individual immigration benefit or green
card applicant will experience, subjecting him or her to the possibility that,
at the conclusion of their adjudication, the adjudicating officer will refer him
or her to removal proceedings. Once an NTA has been issued, even if the
individual then departs from the United States, USCIS will not have the
ability to cancel the NTA.36 Withdrawing an application will not protect an
applicant from the issuance of an NTA under this policy.37 Indeed, although
USCIS states that it will generally not issue an NTA during a period in which
an applicant may file an appeal or a motion to reopen or reconsider, it does
30.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0151,
RESCISSION OF GUIDANCE REGARDING DEFERENCE TO PRIOR DETERMINATIONS OF ELIGIBILITY IN THE
ADJUDICATION OF PETITIONS FOR EXTENSION OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS 2 (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2017/2017-10-23Rescission-ofDeference-PM6020151.pdf.
31.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0050.1,
UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO APPEAR (NTAS) IN
CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS 3 (June 28, 2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-PM-602-0050.1Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf.
32.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0050, REVISED
GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO APPEAR (NTAS) IN CASES
INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND REMOVABLE ALIENS 1 (Nov. 7, 2011) https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/NTA%20PM%20%28Approved%20as
%20final%2011-7-11%29.pdf; see supra text accompanying note 23.
33.
Memorandum from Sam Bernsen, INS General Counsel, to the INS Commissioner, Legal
Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion (July 15, 1976),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/service-exercise-pd.pdf.
34.
USCIS to Begin Implementing New Policy Memorandum on Notices to Appear, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-begin-implementingnew-policy-memorandum-notices-appear (last updated Sept. 26, 2018).
35.
UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO APPEAR
(NTAS) IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS, supra note 31.
36.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., USCIS TELECONFERENCE OF NOTICE TO APPEAR
(NTA) UPDATED POLICY GUIDANCE 4 (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/
nativedocuments/USCIS_Updated_Policy_Guidance_on_Notice_to_Appear_NTA.pdf.
37.
Id.
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expressly reserve the option to issue an NTA before the filing of an appeal,
and states that it may be required to coordinate with ICE to ensure ICE is
aware of the favorable administrative action.38 This complicated and
burdensome procedure is the result of USCIS having no jurisdiction over
removal proceedings, and so once an NTA has been issued, what happens to
the immigrant in removal proceedings is almost entirely out of the agency’s
hands. According to the American Immigration Lawyers Association:
The new NTA policy will also have a chilling effect on legal
immigration in general, discouraging many people who are eligible for
immigration benefits from applying out of fear they will be subject to
unjustified enforcement. Thousands of individuals will face costly
delays and severe consequences such as detention, forcible removable,
and bars to returning to the United States for years. Moreover, this
dramatic shift will divert finite USCIS resources away from its core
mission of adjudicating immigration cases, resulting in even greater
delays in processing that have plagued the agency for years.39
While these new procedural changes facially increase the enforcement
authority of USCIS to implement barriers to lawful immigration, other policy
changes are more insidious. For instance, in the case of international
students, a recent policy memorandum from USCIS has changed the way
“unlawful presence” is calculated.40 As background, when individuals
remain in the United States after the period of stay for which they were
authorized, they begin to accrue what is known as “unlawful presence.”
When they have accrued six months of unlawful presence, they become
subject to a three-year bar to entering the United States.41 With one year of
unlawful presence, that bar extends to ten years, with the potential of a
permanent bar should they attempt to enter the United States while the bar is
active.42
This new policy subjects international students to the consequences of
unlawful presence in circumstances where they may not know that they are
unlawfully present. Where previously a judge or adjudicator would have to
make a determination that the student had violated her status before unlawful
presence began to accrue, the new policy begins counting unlawful presence
starting the day after a status violation occurs. While facially this policy does
not seem to be as forceful in its effect on lawful immigrants as the new RFE
and NTA policies, the application of these new calculation procedures on
international students is potentially life-changing. Under this new policy, a
student who follows the advice of her designated advisor and takes below
the required number of credit hours for a semester, one who works at her on
campus job for 21 hours rather than 20 hours one week, one who babysits,
or even one who volunteers her time for free at a job that would normally be
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 9.
See AILA Policy Brief: New USCIS Notice , supra note 23, at 1..
See U.S. Citizenship & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-1060.1,
ACCRUAL OF UNLAWFUL PRESENCE AND F, J, AND M NONIMMIGRANTS 1–2 (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-08-09-PM-602-1060.1Accrual-of-Unlawful-Presence-and-F-J-and-M-Nonimmigrants.pdf.
41.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).
42.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II); 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).
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compensated will legally become unlawfully present without her knowledge
and without any interaction with a U.S. immigration official. Six months
later that student will be subject to a mandatory three-year bar to entering the
United States. That bar extends to ten years one year after the status violation.
Any dependents of the student will similarly find themselves subject to harsh
immigration penalties with no notice.
Once these policy changes go into effect, the effective enforcement
authority USCIS will have is immense. With the combination of policies
allowing massive discretion to deny applications outright combined with the
discretion to issue NTAs in massively expanded circumstances at USCIS’s
disposal, an applicant who, for example, is attempting to adjust her status to
lawful permanent resident and thus acquire her green card at the conclusion
of her H-1B visa may have her application denied for insufficient initial
evidence43 and be immediately placed in removal proceedings. All foreign
nationals attempting to lawfully immigrate will face massive new procedural
hurdles that did not exist just two years prior.
B.

CHANGES IN AGENCY PRACTICE THAT REDUCE TRANSPARENCY

The second wall also manifests in new agency practices that obfuscate
the way USCIS operates and how new policies affect the immigration laws
in general. For example, a few changed agency practices reflect a concerning
trend in USCIS towards becoming less transparent and less accessible.
InfoPass, a self-scheduled, face-to-face meeting with USCIS officials meant
to give applicants an opportunity to resolve issues in their cases and obtain
information on their cases, is being phased out to encourage applicants to use
only computerized systems.44 Whereas before an immigrant would be able
to schedule a meeting with a USCIS official to ask questions about the status
of her case or the reason behind a decision, this new system would
completely phase out the personal, customer service focused procedure.
Advisory work from the USCIS ombudsman has also completely ceased,
with no new recommendations posted since December 2016.45 Similarly,
with the ombudsman failing to adequately provide oversight to USCIS,
investigations of complaints are not being handled with the requisite
oversight. Implementation of new programs for estimating processing times
lacks the transparency necessary to review agency conclusions and
understand how it calculates estimated processing times.46 For many local
chapters of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, USCIS Liaison
Committees have been disbanded as well. Before these liaison committees
served a symbiotic relationship between the private immigration bar and the
43.
See Kavitha Surana, Authorities Can Now Deny Visa and Green Card Applications Without
Giving Applicants a Chance to Fix Errors, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/
article/authorities-can-now-deny-visa-and-green-card-applications-without-giving-applicants-a-chanceto-fix-errors.
44.
News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS to Expand Information
Services Modernization Program to Key Locations, https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscisexpand-information-services-modernization-program-key-locations (last updated Oct. 30, 2018).
45.
USCIS Ombudsman, Recommendations by the Ombudsman, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
www.dhs.gov/recommendations (last published Nov. 9, 2017).
46.
How USCIS Estimates Application and Petition Processing Times, AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL (July 18, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/uscis-data-applicationand-petition-processing-times.
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government agency, allowing for the transmission of information between
the attorneys and USCIS. Attorneys could voice concerns with new practices
and obtain information directly from the agency. USCIS could use the
immigration attorneys to disseminate information related to new policies and
practices. Without this avenue for attorneys to speak with USCIS, only
general USCIS stakeholder meetings are available.
As a consequence of these and other new policies and adjudication
procedures, historically large backlogs and processing delays in nearly every
category of immigration benefit have developed, to the point that Congress
and advocacy groups say they have reached “crisis levels.”47 While there
does not appear to be a discreet policy decision to slow down the
adjudication of benefits, the backlogs have been difficult for applicants to
understand without USCIS communication to applicants about the progress
of their adjudications. Freedom of Information Act requests filed by
immigration advocates have not been fruitful, and lawsuits are currently
pending to understand why and how such backlogs developed.48 Notably, the
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA)’s findings on the
increased backlog include that there has been a surge in case processing
times by 46% over the past two fiscal years and a 91% increase since fiscal
year 2014.49 These processing delays have even increased as case receipt
volume decreased in fiscal year 2018.50 These delays have led those seeking
green cards or other benefits to be stuck in a legal limbo where they are
vulnerable to the highly publicized increased enforcement initiatives of the
Trump administration and being unable to utilize the many legal and social
benefits that their immigration statuses would impart to them.
C.

SHIFTING SUBSTANTIVE POLICIES THAT PRIORITIZE NATIONAL
SECURITY OVER IMMIGRANTS

Shifting administrative priorities have additionally made it more difficult
for individuals to obtain lawful status for which they would otherwise be
entitled. Specifically, shifting priorities concerning national security and
merit-based immigration are changing the landscape for many lawful
immigrants seeking to navigate long-established immigration pathways.
While the new administration can shift substantive priorities, the impact of
these policies is harmful for immigrants, and some appear pretextual.
1. Intensifying Focus on National Security and Islamic Extremism.
With little obfuscation, USCIS has been targeting specific groups,
including Muslims suspected of terrorist associations, with intensified
screening. For example, USCIS has previously implemented and continues
to utilize a screening process known as the Controlled Application Review
and Resolution Program (CARRP). CARRP is designed to “ensure[] that
immigration benefits are not granted to individuals and organizations that
47.
AILA Policy Brief: USCIS Processing Delays Have Reached Crisis Levels Under the Trump
Administration, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N (Jan. 30, 2019) [hereinafter AILA Policy Brief:
USCIS Processing Delays], https://www.aila.org/infonet/aila-policy-brief-uscis-processing-delays.
48.
See e.g., Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. USCIS, 2:18-cv-08034 (C.D. Cal. filed
Sept. 17, 2018).
49.
See AILA Policy Brief: USCIS Processing Delays, supra note 47, at 1..
50.
Id.
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pose a threat to national security. . . .”51 Because it uses overbroad criteria in
making these national security determinations, it is primarily immigrants
who are Muslim or are from Middle Eastern countries that are affected.52
Individuals who are subject to additional scrutiny through CARRP will find
themselves suffering from significant delays in adjudication, and almost
certain denial.53 Indeed, even if an individual is not considered a “known or
suspected terrorist” after additional screening under CARRP, USCIS officers
are not permitted to approve the application without supervisory approval
and concurrence from a senior level official.54
Among the factors USCIS checks in determining whether individuals
would be subject to CARRP are their employment, training, government
affiliations, “other suspicious activities,” family members, and close
associates.55 The “other suspicious activities” category covers behaviors
ranging from criminal activities such as fraudulent document manufacture
and smuggling or persons, drugs or funds, to large scale transfers or receipt
of funds, to “[u]nusual travel patterns and travel through or residence in areas
of known terrorist activity.”56 All immigrant and nonimmigrant visa
applicants, as well as naturalization applicants, are subject to additional
screening under CARRP.57 USCIS actively looks for reasons to deny a
CARRP petition, including what would otherwise be minor omissions,
including failing to disclose routine stops for secondary inspections at
airports.58
Other attempts at intensified vetting for Muslims have come in the form
of electronic monitoring systems. One such system was the proposed Visa
Lifecycle Vetting, an automated system that was to constantly monitor the
social media of potential visitors to predict whether a migrant will be a
“positively contributing member of society” and “contribute to national
interests”; it is a $100 million system that was termed a “Muslim-ban by

51.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. ACAD., CARRP OFFICER TRAINING: NATIONAL
SECURITY HANDOUTS, GUIDANCE FOR IDENTIFYING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 2 (2009),
https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Guiance-for-Identifying-NSConcerns-USCIS-CARRP-Training-Mar.-2009.pdf; see Oversight of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Border Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (written testimony of Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Sers.).
52.
Yesenia Amaro, Little-Known Law Stops Some Muslims from Obtaining U.S. Citizenship, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J. (Apr. 16, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/little-known-law-stops-somemuslims-from-obtaining-us-citizenship.
53.
JENNIE PASQUARELLA, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., MUSLIMS NEED NOT APPLY:
HOW USCIS MANDATES THE DISCRIMINATORY DELAY AND DENIAL OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
BENEFITS TO ASPIRING AMERICANS 29, 30, 33–36 (2013), https://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/
MUSLIMS_NEED_NOT_APPLY_LCCR_ACLU_SoCal_Report.pdf.
54.
Id. at 36.
55.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. ACAD., supra note 51, at 4–5,
https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Guiance-for-Identifying-NSConcerns-USCIS-CARRP-Training-Mar.-2009.pdf.
56.
Id. (emphasis added).
57.
See PASQUARELLA, supra note 53, at 26.
58.
See KATIE TRAVERSO & JENNIE PASQUARELLA, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL.,
PRACTICE ADVISORY: USCIS’S CONTROLLED APPLICATION REVIEW AND RESOLUTION PROGRAM (Jan.
3, 2017), https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/our_lit/impact_litigation/2017
_03Jan-ACLU-CARRP-advisory.pdf.
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algorithm.”59 While in 2018, ICE abandoned the Visa Lifecycle Vetting
program in the face of overwhelming public opposition,60 a different system
was implemented, and indeed is still in use.
In 2017, in furtherance of Executive Order 13780, the so-called “Travel
Ban,” USCIS implemented a similar system known as “Continuous
Immigration Vetting,” which began a process that constantly vets
information from immigration benefit applications throughout the entire
application period.61 The system operates by continuously vetting both
immigrant and nonimmigrant applications and petitions up to the actual
issuance of a naturalization certificate.62 Where procedural issues, costs, and
public opposition caused the end of the Visa Lifecycle Vetting program, the
Continuous Immigration Vetting System is still operational. These
monitoring operations of such a politically unpopular group demonstrate the
unrelenting fixation this administration has on national security.
2. Shifting National Security Priorities and the Military.
Similarly, immigrants attempting to naturalize or obtain lawful status
through military service have found themselves undergoing forms of
intensified vetting justified on national security grounds that have either
slowed down or completely eliminated these long-established pathways.
Military service has long been a manner in which immigrants have sought
their citizenship.63 Normally a much faster process then naturalizing through
a civilian pathway, programs such as Naturalization at Basic Training have
made the inducements to obtaining citizenship even greater and the process
even faster, though some of these programs have come under criticism for
not working as intended and are now being revisited. Additionally, those
attempting to undertake a pathway to citizenship through the military have
found themselves subject to more strict “intensive” vetting procedures. On
October 13, 2017, the Department of Defense announced a change in its
screening procedures for lawful permanent residents entering the military. 64
This change implemented increased security restrictions on both initial
security screening, as well as for the issuance of certifications of honorable
59.
Faiza Patel & Harsha Panduranga, DHS’ Constant Vetting Initiative: A Muslim-Ban by
Algorithm, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/dhsconstant-vetting-initiative-muslim-ban-algorithm.
60.
JAKE LAPERRUQUE, ICE Backs Down on “Extreme Vetting” Automated Social Media
Scanning, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (May 23, 2018), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/05/icebacks-down-on-extreme-vetting-automated-social-media-scanning.
61.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE CONTINUOUS
IMMIGRATION VETTING (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/pia-uscisfdnsciv-february2019_0.pdf.
62.
Id.
63.
There are two routes provided in the Immigration and Nationality Act that expedite and
streamline naturalization for those in the armed services, as well as specialized programs for those who
are entirely without status to acquire a pathway to citizenship. The peacetime route provided for in INA
328, which has not been used since the Iraq War commenced, mirrors the refugee process post-refugee
determination in many respects: servicemen become LPRs and may naturalize on a fast track. During
periods of hostilities, defined in INA 329, and including the current period following the Iraq War, the
citizenship pathway collapses the LPR and citizen phase such that servicemen can be immediately eligible
for citizenship once they file an application with a fee waiver.
64.
News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD Announces Policy Changes to Lawful Permanent
Residents and the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Pilot Program (Oct. 13,
2017), https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1342317/dod-announ
ces-policy-changes-to-lawful-permanent-residents-and-the-military-acc.
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service that are required to obtain expedited naturalization through military
service.65 Under this new policy, lawful permanent residents attempting to
enter the military must fully complete a background investigation and
receive a favorable military security suitability determination prior to
beginning their service.66 By delaying the issuance of these certificates, this
new policy effectively ends this method of naturalization, as the needed
paperwork cannot be secured. Additionally, lawful permanent residents are
further delayed from applying for their citizenship by 180 days if they are
serving in active duty, or one year if serving in the reserve.67 As a side effect
of the implementation of these increased vetting procedures, for a period of
time, lawful permanent residents were completely barred from entering the
Army Reserve, further delaying naturalization for these individuals.68
For those immigrants who are completely without status, a specialized
program known as the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest
(MAVNI) program created a specialized pathway to citizenship for
noncitizens possessing specialized skills helpful for military operations.
Through this program, established in 2008 by President George W. Bush in
order to give the U.S. military access to immigrants with vital medical or
language skills, immigrants and nonimmigrants would be given a way to
enlist in the military, and thus be given a pathway to citizenship that would
not normally be available to them.69 After ten years, however, the U.S. Army
has been discharging immigrant recruits and reservists who enlisted in the
military with this “promised path to citizenship.”70 The future of this
program has been called into question, and many individuals have been
thrust into a legal limbo as a result.71 Many of these individuals were told
their discharge was the result of being labeled “security risks because they
have relatives abroad,” or that the Department of Defense had not completed
background checks on them.72
In addition to increased vetting for immigrants attempting to enter the
military, and the functional ending of MAVNI, data suggests that those who
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
See Ashley Edwards & Emily C. Singer, Exclusive: Army Reserve Bans Green Card Holders
From Enlisting, a Move That May Break Federal Law, MIC (Oct. 17, 2017), https://mic.com/articles/
185297/exclusive-army-bans-green-card-holders-from-enlisting-a-move-that-may-break-federallaw#.MdpEYaYT.
69.
See The MAVNI Program: Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest, CITIZENPATH
(May 1, 2018), https://citizenpath.com/mavni-program. Of note, those citizens who eventually
naturalized through the MAVNI program were also subject to additional bi-annual security check ins – a
practice that a federal judge in Seattle enjoined as illegally discriminatory on January 31, 2019. See
Lorelei Laird, Defense Department Engaged in Illegal Discrimination Against Some Soldiers, District
Court Finds, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2019, 4:55 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/defensedepartment-engaged-in-illegal-national-origin-discrimination-district-court-finds.
70.
Martha Mendoza & Garance Burke, US Army Begins Quietly Discharging Immigrant Recruits
on Path to Citizenship, USA TODAY (July 5, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/
07/05/army-discharging-immigrants/762021002.
71.
See Tara Copp, Here’s the Bottom Line on the Future of MAVNI: Many Foreign-Born Recruits
May Soon Be Out, MILITARY TIMES (July 6, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourmilitary/2018/07/06/heres-the-bottom-line-on-the-future-of-mavni-many-foreign-born-recruits-maysoon-be-out.
72.
Id. The Department of Defense assured in a prepared statement that “[a]ll service members . .
. and those with an honorable discharge are protected from deportation.” However, the Associated Press
reports that many of these individuals received an “uncharacterized discharge,” and so it is unclear if this
protection will apply to them.
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are attempting to naturalize through military service are facing increasingly
high denial rates while adjudication rates are rapidly falling. During second
quarter of fiscal year 2016, there were 2,409 applications for naturalization
specifically through the military.73 Of those applications, 124 were denied,
giving an overall denial rate of approximately 5.1%.74 Adjudication fell
dramatically in fiscal year 2017, while denials increased. In the second
quarter of fiscal year 2017 USCIS adjudicated 1,361 applications for
naturalization specifically through the military, over 1,000 fewer than the
year prior.75 Of these, 130 were denied, giving a denial rate of approximately
9.5% - nearly double the rate at the same time the previous year. 76 Fiscal
year 2018 has thus far shown even higher rates of denials, with adjudications
falling far below even the 2017 average. In the first quarter of fiscal year
2018, USCIS adjudicated only 946 applications to naturalize through the
military.77 Of these, 191 were denied, giving an overall denial rate of
approximately 20.2%.78 In the second quarter of fiscal year 2018, USCIS
adjudicated only 496 applications for naturalization through the military. 79
Of those, 76 were denied, giving an ultimate denial rate of approximately
15.3%.80
3. Diminishment of Refugee Admissions.
A final shift in immigration policy that places a new emphasis on
national security over legal immigrants is in the context of refugee
admissions. The admission of refugees to the United States is authorized by
the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Refugee Act of
1980. This mainstay of U.S. immigration has two basic purposes: to provide
a uniform procedure for refugee admissions, and to authorize federal
assistance to resettle refugees and promote their self-sufficiency.81 While
legally authorized and, to many, morally appropriate, this humanitarian form
of legal migration has also been under attack during the Trump
73.
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NUMBER OF
N-400 APPLICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION BY CATEGORY OF NATURALIZATION, CASE STATUS, AND
USCIS FIELD OFFICE LOCATION JANUARY 1 – MARCH 31, 2016 (May 2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Naturaliza
tion%20Data/N400_performancedata_fy2016_qtr2.pdf.
74.
Id.
75.
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NUMBER OF
N-400 APPLICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION BY CATEGORY OF NATURALIZATION, CASE STATUS, AND
USCIS FIELD OFFICE LOCATION JANUARY 1 – MARCH 31, 2017 (June 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Natur
alization%20Data/N400_performancedata_fy2017_qtr2.pdf.
76.
Id.
77.
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NUMBER OF
N-400 APPLICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION BY CATEGORY OF NATURALIZATION, CASE STATUS, AND
USCIS FIELD OFFICE LOCATION OCTOBER 1 – DECEMBER 31, 2017 (May 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Natur
alization%20Data/N400_performancedata_fy2018_qtr1.pdf.
78.
Id.
79.
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NUMBER OF
N-400 APPLICATIONS FOR NATURALIZATION BY CATEGORY OF NATURALIZATION, CASE STATUS, AND
USCIS FIELD OFFICE LOCATION JANUARY 1 – MARCH 31, 2018 (July 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Naturaliza
tion%20Data/N400_performancedata_fy2018_qtr2.pdf
80.
Id.
81.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND RESETTLEMENT POLICY (Dec. 18,
2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf.
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administration – beyond even that based on the so called “Travel Ban.”82 The
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) was directed in September,
2017 through a Presidential Determination that a maximum of 45,000
refugees could be admitted in Fiscal Year 2018 – the lowest ceiling ever set.83
Further, this historically low refugee ceiling was far from reached, with only
19,899 refugees having been admitted as of August 31, 2018.84 This
unexplained failure to even approach the refugee admissions ceiling for
fiscal year 2018 has prompted a bipartisan group of 63 U.S. Representatives
to send a letter to DHS Secretary Nielsen and DOS Secretary Pompeo in
support of the USRAP and requesting an explanation for the decline in
refugee admissions during FY 2018.85 The U.S. government has stated that
the refugee ceiling will be further reduced to 30,000 maximum refugee
admittances in Fiscal Year 2019.86 All this in the context of the largest
refugee displacement crisis in recent history, with more than 5.6 million
Syrians displaced as refugees, and where other countries are significantly
ramping up their refugee admissions to accommodate this crisis.87
D.

SHIFTING SUBSTANTIVE POLICY PRIORITIES THAT EMPHASIZE
MERIT-BASED MIGRATION

In addition to a renewed emphasis on national security concerns, new
immigration policies have started to prioritize immigrants of merit, contrary
to the long-established emphasis that the United States immigration system
has placed on family and humanitarian immigration.
1. Restrictions on Immigrants Likely to Become Public Charges.
New rules meant to reduce the amount of public benefits utilized by
immigrants and to curtail the immigration of those who would use them are
one method the new administration has taken to narrow the type of
immigrant that the United States will accept. As of September 24, 2018, the
Trump administration is tightening restrictions on low-income immigrants
by proposing a new rule expanding the scope of the “public charge” ground
of inadmissibility.88 Legally, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, any
noncitizen who “in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of
application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time
of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to
become a public charge is inadmissible [. . .] In determining whether an alien
82.
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (March 6, 2017).
83.
Presidential Determination No. 2017-13, 82 Fed. Reg. 49,083 (Sept. 29, 2017).
84.
REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS REPORT (Aug. 31,
2018).
85.
Letter Regarding Refugee Admissions from 63 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
to Kirstjen Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., & Mike Pompeo, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State,
(July 17, 2018), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/whats-happening-in-congress/congressional-updates/
house-members-qs-dhs-dos-re-refugee-admissiions.
86.
Lesley Wroughton, U.S. To Sharply Limit Refugee Flows to 30,000 in 2019, REUTERS (Sept.
17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-pompeo/u-s-to-sharply-limit-refugeeflows-to-30000-in-2019-idUSKCN1LX2HS.
87.
Syrian Refugee Crisis: Facts, FAQs, and How To Help, WORLD VISION (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts.
88.
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Proposed Change to Public Charge Ground of
Inadmissibility (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/proposed-change-public-chargeground-inadmissibility.
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is excludable under this paragraph, the consular officer of the Attorney
General shall at minimum consider the alien’s (I) age; (II) health; (III) family
status; (IV) assets, resources, and financial status; and (V) education and
skills. . . .”89 This policy seeks to ensure that those who immigrate to the
United States are self-sufficient, and will not become burdens to society.
However, under this new approach to determining who qualifies as
“likely to become a public charge,” an immigrant who utilizes food stamps,
Medicaid, or housing assistance will find herself unable to sponsor relatives
for admission to the United States, and, if she finds herself applying for a
green card after using these benefits, she may be found ineligible as someone
likely to become a “public charge.” 90
Early studies on the proposed rule from leaked drafts in March 2018
demonstrate that the number of potential noncitizens who could face a public
charge determination would increase fifteen-fold.91 The study anticipates a
massive “chilling effect” on immigrants’ use of health, nutrition, and social
services, and anticipates that these effects are likely to expand beyond the
immigrants themselves to the U.S. citizen children of immigrants.92 Indeed
such chilling effects are already being reported despite the final rule not yet
going into effect, with fearful immigrants declining food assistance and
emergency Medicaid in anticipation that it may affect future immigration
proceedings for themselves or their families.93 It is also not just noncitizens
that are impacted by this changed rule – the rule does not differentiate
between benefits sought for one’s own use and those sought for a U.S. citizen
dependent, such as a child. In effect, the consequences of this policy are
being pronounced to a large extent on children who ostensibly are not meant
to be the target of the policy.
2. Restrictions on Temporary Workers.
Similarly, under the guise of protecting American jobs and combatting
fraud, new restrictionist policies have started to target temporary workers,
specifically prioritizing those temporary workers who have the most
academic or economic merit. Executive Order 13,788, better known by the
title “Buy American and Hire American” was one such policy change that
both directly and indirectly targeted temporary workers.94 Directly targeted
were the high-skilled workers who fell under the H-1B visa category. The
executive order explicitly tasked the Department of Homeland Security with
implementing policies to ensure that the H-1B visas are awarded only “to the
most-skilled or highest-paid petition beneficiaries.”95
89.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4).
90.
See Tami Luhby & Tal Kopan, How Trump’s New Definition of ‘Public Charge’ Will Affect
Immigrants, CNN (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/25/politics/immigration-publicbenefits/index.html.
91.
JEANNE BATALOVA ET AL., CHILLING EFFECTS: THE EXPECTED PUBLIC CHARGE RULE AND ITS
IMPACT ON LEGAL IMMIGRANT FAMILIES’ PUBLIC BENEFITS USE, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (June 2018),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/chilling-effects-expected-public-charge-rule-impact-legalimmigrant-families.
92.
Id.
93.
Paul J. Fleming & William D. Lopez, Families Are Choosing Between Their Health and
Staying Together, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 9, 2019), https://theconversation.com/families-are-choosingbetween-their-health-and-staying-together-108865.
94.
Exec. Order No. 13,788, 82 Fed. Reg. 18,837 (Apr. 18, 2017).
95.
Id. at § 5(b).
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In practice, when applying for an H-1B visa, employers have to show
that they will be paying the “prevailing wage” for the job for which they will
be employing an immigrant, as well as show that the individual they employ
will be working in a “specialty occupation.”96 The archetypal H-1B worker
works in the Information Technology field and is from either India or
China,97 but with the new priority given to the “most skilled” and “highest
paid” beneficiaries, the lower-level computer scientists and programmers are
finding it increasingly difficult to obtain visas, or, if already in the United
States, to continue their employment. Indeed, new policy memoranda from
USCIS subjects those in the information technology field to more strict
requirements than it once did.98
As the “Buy American and Hire American” policy was implemented, H1B visas categorically became increasingly difficult to obtain, with data
acquired by the National Foundation for American Policy showing an almost
immediate increase in denials and Requests for Evidence from USCIS. 99 As
the report states, “the proportion of H-1B petitions denied for foreign-born
professionals increased by 41% from the 3rd to the 4th quarter of FY 2017,
rising from a denial rate of 15.9% in the 3rd quarter to 22.4% in the 4th
quarter.”100 Similarly, “[t]he number of Requests for Evidence in the 4th
quarter of FY 2017 almost equaled the total number issued by USCIS
adjudicators for the first three quarters of FY 2017 combined.”101
While increasing the denial rates for these visas, the administration also
significantly slowed down the application processing by suspending the
ability of employers to pay a premium fee for expedited adjudication – a
process known as “premium processing.”102 The suspension was originally
slated to last until September of 2018, but was extended to February of
2019.103 While these slowdowns appear to add simple procedural hurdles to
an H-1B applicant, in effect this change may deny a large number of
96.
97.

See 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h).
Rani Molla, Workers from India and China Received 82 Percent of U.S. H-1B Visas Last Year,
RECODE (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/4/13/15281170/china-india-tech-h1b-visas.
98.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0142,
RESCISSION OF THE DECEMBER 22, 2000 “GUIDANCE MEMO ON H1B COMPUTER RELATED POSITIONS”
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/PM-6002-0142-H-1B
ComputerRelatedPositionsRecission.pdf.
99.
Stuart Anderson, New Evidence USCIS Policies Increased Denials of H-1B Visas, FORBES
(July 25, 2018, 12:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/07/25/new-evidenceuscis-policies-increased-denials-of-h-1b-visas/#7ff440f55a9f.
100. Id.
101. Id. Other forms of temporary worker visas have also been significantly burdened under the
new administration. In Guam, from FY 2015 to FY 2016, H-2B visas for construction workers went from
an approximately 100% approval rate to a 0% approval rate. A class action lawsuit was filed, and litigation
is ongoing on the issue, but approval rates remain at approximately 0% for H-2B visas that do not fall
within a specific military exemption, and the Pacific island has been without construction labor for nearly
three years now in what is being called the “H-2B crisis.” See, e.g., Kevin Kerrigan, Delegate Seeks
Solution to H-2B Crisis, GUAM DAILY POST (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.postguam.com/news/
local/delegate-seeks-solution-to-h--b-crisis/article_26fa19da-208a-11e9-b059-bb8d7764ec1e.html.
102. News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Extends and Expands
Suspension of Premium Processing for H-1B Petitions to Reduce Delays (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-extends-and-expands-suspension-premium-processing-h-1bpetitions-reduce-delays.
103. Id.; News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Resumes Premium
Processing for H-1B Petitions Filed on or Before Dec. 21, 2018 (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-resumes-premium-processing-h-1b-petitions-filed-ordec-21-2018.
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petitions, as the number of visas that may be issued is capped, and that cap
is reached within one week of the application opening every year.104 Most
affected by this delay are those workers who are already in the United States
and need to travel internationally, as travel while an H-1B change of status
request is pending will cause the petition to be considered abandoned by
USCIS, leaving many high skilled workers essentially trapped as they wait
for an adjudication burdened by significant processing delays.105
Other barriers to the high-skilled worker category simply create
additional cost and hassle for those attempting to acquire an H-1B visa, or
those trying to employ H-1B visa holders. New policies now target
employers with high numbers of H-1B workers or those who contract out H1B workers with on-site visits.106 These visits are a part of a larger initiative
by USCIS to identify and target fraud and abuse within the H-1B system as
a whole.107 Efforts to grant the visa to only the “highest paid” and “most
skilled” beneficiaries are undercutting the business model for large numbers
of companies who traditionally import temporary workers. Additionally, as
the spike in Requests for Evidence demonstrates, the effort and expense of
gathering documents and relevant evidence has greatly increased under these
new policies.
3. Proposals to Curtail Chain Migration and Diversity Visas.
In perhaps the clearest example of the new administration’s shifting
policy priorities to favor merit-based immigration, there has been a large
push to completely do away with one of the central tenants of U.S.
immigration – that of family sponsorship. Derisively branded “chainmigration,” family sponsored immigration has been the basis of the U.S.
immigration system since the mid-20th century. Under proposed legislation,
however, this policy would be curtailed or eliminated in favor of a pointbased system that prioritizes high-paid, young, and male applicants.108 Such
a drastic change in the U.S. immigration system would completely remove
avenues of immigration for such people as elderly parents, siblings, or adult
children of U.S. citizens.
Similarly, the administration has a stated interest in ending the diversity
visa program, which has been used since the 1990s to allow for immigrants
from countries with low immigration rates to receive green cards and enter
104. News Alert, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Completes the H-1B Cap Random
Selection Process for FY 2019 (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-completes-h-1bcap-random-selection-process-fy-2019.
105. H-1B Premium Processing Suspended Until February 2019, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
MGMT. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/
uscis-h1b-premium-processing-suspended-february-2019.aspx.
106. News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Putting American Workers First:
USCIS Announces Further Measures to Detect H-1B Visa Fraud and Abuse (Apr. 3, 2017),
https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/putting-american-workers-first-uscis-announces-furthermeasures-detect-h-1b-visa-fraud-and-abuse.
107. Combating Fraud and Abuse in the H-1B Visa Program, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., (July 23, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty
-occupations-and-fashion-models/combating-fraud-and-abuse-h-1b-visa-program.
108. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE RAISE ACT: WHAT LIES BENEATH THE PROPOSED POINTS
SYSTEM? 4 (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_raise_act_what_lies_b
eneath_the_proposed_points_system.pdf.
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the United States.109 Citing concerns that those seeking the diversity visa
were the people that foreign countries “don’t want,” the President has made
it clear that he seeks either the diminishment or complete removal of the
program in any immigration reform deal.110
The effect of these proposals would be to do away with the emphasis that
the U.S. has historically placed on diversity in immigration. Similarly it
would end the long-term emphasis that the U.S. has placed on family.
Instead, the new policies would place more weight on economic priorities to
the exclusion of all other factors.
IV.

SECOND WALL BARRIERS

Resistance to the excesses of immigration enforcement at the first wall
has taken the form of a sanctuary movement. The meaning of sanctuary has
evolved in different contexts.111 As a historical matter, sanctuary referred to
a church-based movement of shielding Central American asylum-seekers in
the 1980s.112 During the Obama administration, sanctuary referred to local
policies resisting the enforcement actions against so-called criminal aliens
such as the transfer of immigrants from jails to ICE detention facilities on
the completion of their criminal sentences.113 The Trump Executive Order on
interior enforcement identified sanctuary policies as a range of local policies
pledging to not cooperate with federal immigration enforcement.114 These
sanctuary policies have become lightning rods for high-visibility litigation
in federal courts. They have also served as the organizing principle for a
loose network of institutions that seeks to protect a wide range of vulnerable
immigrants, whether in churches, campuses, or corporations.115 The specific
goals of the networked resistance ranges from refusing to disclose sensitive
information about at-risk immigrants to providing them with safe and

109. Kaitlyn Schallhorn, What Is the Diversity Visa Program and Why Does Trump Want to End
It?, FOX NEWS (Jan 15, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/what-is-the-diversity-visa-programand-why-does-trump-want-to-end-it.
110. Id.
111. Rose Cuison Villazor, What is A Sanctuary? 61 SMU L. REV. 133 (2008).
112. See ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW IN
COLLISION 62 (1988) (discussing the biblical roots of sanctuary); Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws:
Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 928–31 (1995)
(examining the biblical foundations of sanctuaries); Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an
Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
747, 749–51 (1986) (noting that the concept of sanctuary may be found in several passages of the Bible);
Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury – A Government’s Weapon Against the
Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 38–48 (1986) (providing a brief historical discussion of
sanctuaries). See also HILARY CUNNINGHAM, GOD AND CAESAR AT THE RIO GRANDE: SANCTUARY AND
THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 25 (1995).
113. See Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1197 (2016); Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV.
1703 (2018).
114. See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,801 (Jan. 25,
2017) (defining sanctuary jurisdictions as those that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373”).
See also Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 519–21 (N.D. Cal. 2017), reconsideration
denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (defining sanctuary jurisdictions as those
encompassing jurisdictions that have “a policy or practice that hinders the enforcement of Federal law . .
. .”).
115. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 1209 (2018).
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affirming spaces.116 They have extended the momentum and reach of the
sanctuary movement as an organized effort to protect immigrants.
These first wall instances of sanctuary networks serve as a baseline for
assessing where second wall strategies fall short. Litigation against second
wall policies tend to be individual actions with case-by-case impact, low
visibility, and limited prospects for setting precedent in federal courts.
Political action opposing second wall policies is scant, with few media
headlines attracting public attention or escalating political pressure. Outside
of mainstream institutions and establishment politics, mass protest to the
second wall policies is virtually nonexistent. While there are emerging
efforts to counter attacks on legal migration, the opposition to the second
wall pales in comparison to mass protests and calls to abolish ICE, cease
family separation, or rescind the travel ban. This quiescence toward the
second wall is proof of how it’s far reaching consequences are not
understood as a systematic assault on legal immigrants.
In the context of the second wall, building a more effective strategy of
opposition requires building on individual litigation to activate broader
political pressure and more coordinated legal action. Part III highlighted
examples of second wall opposition. It analyzes them for their promise and
pitfalls, finding as obstacles the invisibility, complexity, and competing
policy justifications that underlie shifting priorities in immigration policy.
Overcoming these obstacles requires scaling the second wall.
A.

LIMITATIONS TO DIRECT REPRESENTATION

As recounted in Part II, the primary source of resistance to the second
wall has been through litigating individual case-by-case challenges. The
Transaction Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), a data gathering, data
research, and data distribution service that provides information about public
institutions, at Syracuse University, has issued data noting a massive increase
in federal litigation surrounding denials and delays of naturalization
applications.117 Specifically, as of December 2018, TRAC found a 26%
increase in federal litigation from six months prior, a 29% increase from one
year prior, and a 66% increase from five years prior.118 Increasingly, these
suits are mandamus actions meant to compel USCIS to make a decision on
an application—a direct result of a backlog that has many immigrants
waiting for many months or years for final decisions. DHS also saw record
numbers of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests in 2017, attributed
to the new policies coming out of the agencies, and similarly saw a spike in
the amount of appeals and litigation surrounding these disclosures.119
Yet other major litigation is the result of employers or those seeking
employment-based visas feeling the economic effects of tightening legal
immigration policies. Information Technology companies have challenged a
116. Chen, supra note 17.
117. Increased Litigation for Denials and Delays on Naturalization Applications, TRAC REPORTS
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/544/.
118. Id.
119. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORT TO ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
SERVICES, at ii (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY%202017%20DHS%20
FOIA%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
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new policy from USCIS allowing for significantly limited visa duration for
high-tech workers.120 Construction companies based in Guam are in the
midst of a class-action lawsuit alleging a new, unpublished policy from
USCIS has caused approval rates for temporary work visas to plummet from
nearly 100% to nearly 0% in less than one year.121 Foreign nationals seeking
investment based EB-5 visas have also filed a class-action lawsuit over the
substantial delays and backlogs in the program, alleging that the U.S.
government has been miscounting the limited annual supply of visas.122
Universities organized in opposition to a recent change in policy from USCIS
related to how unlawful presence is calculated for international students,
utilizing both the public comment process and litigation to voice their
opposition.123 Faith-based organizations have made a resurgence in recent
years, with many organizing in opposition to such policies as the public
charge rule.124 Such organizations have been central to challenging laws
meant to end “chain migration.”125 In response to discharges of immigrant
recruits, increased scrutiny of noncitizens upon enlistment, and the
deportations of veterans, veterans groups have also drastically increased their
efforts in advocating for immigrants’ rights.126
This eclectic array of groups bringing case-by-case challenges has had
mixed success. As Nina Rabin notes, these types of challenges have been
effective tools to fight back against the Trump Administration’s enforcement
onslaught, and they have achieved individual success on a case-by-case
basis.127 Accumulating individual successes, however, does not by itself add
up to a systematic challenge. Some of the reasons the individual litigation
has not enlarged into collective action are intuitive. Many of the challenger
groups are new to immigration politics, having not often been central figures
in prior debates regarding immigration. This may be one reason why
litigation against second wall policies has been so issue-specific. The
challengers may not be as plugged into well-established issue networks and
there may be more start-up costs to mobilizing on any given issue. As a
result, these challengers act in relatively uncoordinated ways. For example,
in challenging the tightening restrictions on use of public benefits as a result
of the new public charge rule, large-scale healthcare organizations, such as
the American Medical Association and American Academy of Pediatrics,
organized physicians in opposition to the rule, and further attempted to
recruit the physicians in their organizations in submitting public
120. See ITServe All., Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 1:18-CV-02350 (D.D.C.
Oct. 11, 2018).
121. See Guam Contractors Ass’n, v. Sessions, 1:16-CV-00075 (D. Gu. Oct. 4, 2016).
122. See Wang v. Pompeo, 1:18-CV-01732 (D.D.C. July 25, 2018).
123. Complaint, Guilford Coll. v. Nielson, Civ. Action 18-891 (M.D.N.C. filed Oct. 23, 2018),
https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/1094000/1094960/https-ecf-ncmd-uscourts-gov-doc113312981437.pdf.
124. Interfaith Immigration Coalition Members Denounce Proposed Changes to Public Charge
Definition, INTERFAITH IMMIGR. COALITION (Sept. 23, 2018), http://www.interfaithimmigration.org/
2018/09/23/interfaith-immigration-coalition-members-denounce-proposed-changes-to-public-chargerule/.
125. Maria Benevento, ‘Chain Migration’ Misrepresents Reality, Say Catholic Advocates, NAT’L
CATH. REPORTER (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.ncronline.org/news/justice/chain-migrationmisrepresents-reality-say-catholic-advocates.
126. Anna Núñez, We Should Better Serve Immigrant Vets, Protect Them from Deportation, AM.’S
VOICE (Feb. 22, 2018), https://americasvoice.org/blog/tcrp-report-veterans/.
127. Rabin, supra note 10.
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comments.128 Disability rights organizations also came together in
opposition to the rule, organizing comment campaigns against the new
policy that they described as a “dangerous Catch-22 for the disability
community.”129 Gay rights groups fearful of AIDS elimination have
mobilized as well.130 Rather than forging a broad coalition, however, these
health groups have fought in isolation to traditional immigrants’ rights
groups.
B.

LIMITATIONS TO STRUCTURAL REFORMS

Other reasons that the extant challenges to second wall policies have not
generated broad public pressure, despite their individual successes, come to
light by considering the features of the second wall that make the ingredients
of a social movement elusive: the second wall is hard to understand because
of its invisibility and complexity, it is hard to redress because of the lack of
political accountability and judicial reviewability, and it is hard to dispute
because of the possibly pretextual policy justifications offered in their
defense.
1. Invisibility.
One of the reasons that resistance is more scant is that the second wall is
harder to see than the first. The second wall policies arise within countless
individual acts of discretion. Individual immigrants and their advocates see
their cases delayed or denied without realizing the broader patterns taking
hold. Those caught within the backlog may not even be informed that
anything is amiss given the reduced transparency of agency practices. As a
result, the issues are perceived singularly, one issue at a time, rather than as
part of a broader trend or pattern in enforcement. Without being able to
connect the dots, negatively impacted groups do not comprehend the scope
or character of the shifting policies. For example, the package of more
burdensome procedures for obtaining immigration benefits has not
surprisingly contributed to slower processing times and a backlog of
adjudications in nearly every category of immigration benefit. Most of the
time, these individual defeats do not catalyze coordinated action.131
Interest in the backlog has been focused in national immigrant advocacy
groups such as the National Partnership for New Americans (NPNA) and the
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA). NPNA and AILA have
128. Oppose Harmful Changes to the “Public Charge Rules” Which Could Deter Millions of Legal
Immigrants from Seeking Health Care, MASS. MED. SOC’Y (Nov. 26, 2018),
http://www.massmed.org/Advocacy/Federal-Advocacy/Oppose-harmful-changes-to-the%E2%80%9CPublic-Charge-Rules%E2%80%9D-which-could-deter-millions-of-legal-immigrantsfrom-seeking-health-care/; Ethics Talk: Commenting on the “Public Charge” and How to Respond to
Federal Policy Change Proposals that Will Affect Patients’ Health, AMA J. ETHICS (Nov. 2018),
https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/podcast/ethics-talk-commenting-public-charge-and-how-respondfederal-policy-change-proposals-will-affect.
129. Rebecca Cokley & Hannah Leibson, Trump’s Public-Charge Rule Would Threaten Disabled
Immigrants’ Health and Safety, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 8, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/disability/news/2018/08/08/454537/trumps-public-chargerule-threaten-disabled-immigrants-health-safety/.
130. See Linda Tam & Theo Cuison, Immigration Law, in AIDS AND THE LAW (Scott SkinnerThompson ed., 2019).
131. Rabin, supra note 10 at 24 (describing the case-by-case strategy as a fight that feels
“Sisyphean,” yet plays a crucial role in pushing back against these insidious enforcement trends).
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worked hard to collect information about the size and growth of the backlogs
in immigration benefits. In one of its campaigns, NPNA enlisted 50 mayors
and county officials to press USCIS Director Lee Francis Cissna for
explanations for the backlog through a Freedom of Information Act Request
(FOIA).132 They followed up by filing a lawsuit to compel USCIS to disclose
information about its naturalization backlog on Citizenship Day. Lawyers in
subsequent lawsuits have kept up this pressure and urged that delayed cases
be addressed.133 AILA broadcast the results of NPNA’s reports and
independent research conducted by TRAC. It took its findings to Congress,
urging Congressional oversight over USCIS. Together these groups are
mounting a challenge to the procedural delays and growing backlog by
highlighting the absence of information as the problem and by providing a
narrative frame for illustrating the consequences of the institutional failures
for immigrants’ civil and future voting rights. The information gathering and
the publicity about the lack of transparency helps to frame the consequences
of changing policies as a collective action problem, though the success of the
strategy will turn on whether it garners attention and generates responses
from policymakers.134
2. Complexity
Another barrier that makes the second wall harder to understand than the
first wall is that many of the second wall policies are highly technical. Many
involve obscure agency procedures. The updated guidelines for requesting
additional evidence, calculating unlawful presence, or declining to defer to
prior adjudications, for example, are highly technical, and it is not obvious
how they are related to one another. Nor is it obvious how they relate to the
increasing backlogs on the adjudication of immigration benefits. Increased
backlogs may instead be easily dismissed as procedural defects of a poorly
operating bureaucracy rather than understood as a deliberate policy strategy.
The combination of poor visibility and poor comprehension impedes social
movement mobilization.135
That is not to say that these policies have altogether evaded notice.
Recognizing the “massive reconfiguration of the immigration laws relating
to higher education,” several colleges and universities sued USCIS over its
new unlawful presence policy on October 23, 2018.136 The new policies
132. Letter from U.S. Mayors to Lee Francis Cissna, Dir., USCIS (July 30, 2018),
https://www.aila.org/infonet/us-mayors-uscis-backlog-citizenship-applications (addressing the consistent
backlog of citizenship application before USCIS).
133. See Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 2:18cv-08034 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 17, 2018).
134. The literature on law and social movements articulates the importance of collective action
frames and framing processes as critical dynamics for the course of a social movement. Visibility is a
prerequisite to strategic framing. For a summary of the framing literature, see Robert D. Benford & David
A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC.
611 (2000).
135. The translation of individual disputes into collective action problems or legally actionable
issues is the essence of framing processes that is described in the law and social movements literature and
the legal mobilization literature. See Benford & Snow, supra note 134; see also William L.F. Felstiner et
al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 631 (1980).
136. Complaint at 2, Guilford Coll. v. Nielson, Civ. Action 18-891 (M.D.N.C. filed Oct. 23, 2018),
https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/1094000/1094960/https-ecf-ncmd-uscourts-gov-doc113312981437.pdf.
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enhance the consequences of an international student falling out of
compliance with statutory requirements on the basis of a complex calculation
of time that departs from prior policy and common sense. The suit is still in
its nascent stages. So far the universities have obtained a temporary
restraining order blocking the application of the new policy precisely
because the impact of the policy is hard to understand.137 Central to the
court’s decision to grant this injunction was the court’s own confusion as to
when and if the new policy would apply to the plaintiffs, citing a “lack of
clarity” in the policy’s application that may pave the way for finding the
policy “arbitrary and capricious.”138 Presumably such confusion on the part
of legal experts would carry over to international students trying in good faith
to remain in compliance with their visa requirements. Larger movements in
opposition to the unlawful presence policies are notably lacking, but expert
driven litigation remains the primary opposition to complex second wall
policies.
3. Lack of Accountability.
Additionally, many of the USCIS agency practices change through
administrative channels that escape public attention, political oversight, and
judicial review because of the discretionary nature of the decisions. Agencies
are still subject to Congressional oversight and elicit some public scrutiny
when making changes under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as
seen in the proposed rule to redefine public charge. Typically, the APA
requires that changes to policy that have significant practical effects must be
subject to public review through an administrative hearing before they go
into effect, in order to grant affected parties notice and an opportunity to
challenge the rule.
In addition, Congress has done little to engage USCIS policy changes
because there is little political pay-off for doing so. They have largely been
beholden to, quiescent about, or distracted by the GOP and President’s calls
for more restrictions rather than seeking to preserve pathways to admission
or integration for legal immigrants. These second wall policies may not
appear on their radar because of insufficient monitoring and signaling of fire
alarms by nonprofit groups or because members score fewer political points
for addressing them than they do for addressing the “first wall.” Or even if
they are on the radar, the rules remain too technical to explain to the public
and seem low stakes given that the USCIS is not subject to ongoing
monitoring through appropriations as a user-funded agency. Once the
political control of the House of Representatives shifted in early 2019, signs
of increasing oversight from Congress over USCIS emerged, though the
immigration debate remains primarily centered around border issues.
Specifically, Congress has sent letters to the Ombudsman of USCIS detailing
concerns with derelictions of the statutory duty to serve immigrants,
especially in light of the director’s former employment as the executive
director of the restrictionist organization the Federation for American
137. Guilford Coll. v. Nielson, Civ. Action 18CV891 (M.D.N.C. 2019), http://www.nafsa.org/_
/file/_/amresource/guilfordorders20190503.pdf.
138. Order, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Guilford Coll. v. Nielson, Civ. Action 18-891, at 3
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2019)
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Immigration Reform (FAIR).139 Additionally, eighty-five House Democrats
sent a letter to the director of USCIS raising concerns about the growing
backlog in immigration benefits.140
Courts are limited in their review of these individual decisions and
agency policies after years of jurisdiction stripping.141 The limited judicial
review for courts builds on a long tradition of deference to the political
branches and enforcement discretion in immigration, both plenary power
from the early days of immigration enforcement and more recently executive
enforcement discretion widely used under President Obama and President
Trump.142 To Congress and federal courts, it is not only unclear what the
impact of changes in procedures will be, but the available avenues for
evaluating the procedural changes is also limited. This creates a classic
problem for public law scholars acquainted with the dilemmas of political
control of agencies.143
4. Competing Policy Justifications.
Finally, many of the second wall policies seem justified as needed
protections or fixes for a broken immigration system. Specific immigrant
subgroups representing Arab Americans and Muslims have been sensitive to
worries that their members are unduly subjected to extra screening, longer
delays, and higher denials through programs like CARRP, under the guise of
posing national security risks.144 Civil rights groups raise worries that
139. Letter from U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Reform to Julie
Kirchner, Ombudsman, USCIS (Feb. 6, 2019), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.
house.gov/files/documents/2019-02-06.EEC%20to%20Kirchner%20re.%20CIS%20Ombudsman.pdf.
140. Letter from U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Members to Francis Cissna, Dir.,
USCIS (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/whats-happening-in-congress/congressionalupdates/us-representatives-demand-accountability-uscis.
141. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act, and REAL ID Act are examples of jurisdiction stripping in immigration
law. For the harmful effects of jurisdiction stripping on immigration law, see Daniel Kanstroom, The
Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the ‘Rule’ of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y. L. SCH.
L. REV. 16 (2006).
142. Classic articles on plenary power in immigration law include Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More
Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 Hastings Const. L. Q. 925 (1995)
and Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Power Congressional Power,
Sup. Ct. Rev. 255 (1984).
143. The public law scholarship on this issue includes classic essays from political scientists such
as Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast to legal scholars Peter Strauss, Peter Shane,
Elena Kagan, Gillian Metzger, Eloise Pasachoff, and many others. For a select few articles that mention
immigration as an example, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984) (discussing INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983)); Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031 (2013) (discussing
DACA); Ming H. Chen, Administrator-In-Chief: President and Executive Action in Immigration Law, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 347 (2017) (discussing DACA, Secure Communities, and Operation in Border
Guardian).
144. The Arab American Institute lists the Muslim ban, calls for extreme vetting policies, cutbacks
on the refugee resettlement programs, the revival of the post-9/11 National Security Entry-Exit
Registration system, and massive backlogs along the pathway to citizenship for high-skilled workers and
family-sponsored immigrants alike among its chief concerns: “From calling for ‘extreme vetting’ to
include ideological purity tests for incoming immigrants to specifically questioning immigrants regarding
their religious views, and regularly calling for the suspension of the U.S. refugee resettlement program,
the President-elect’s immigration proposals are cause for concern and are reminiscent of some of
America’s darkest days.” AAI Issue Brief: Bigotry, ARAB AM. INST. (last visited Mar. 28, 2019),
http://www.aaiusa.org/aai_issue_brief_bigotry. The American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee has
submitted comments on proposed changes to the refugee program and has urged Congressional response
to the Syrian refugee crisis and the needs of Palestinians, while standing in solidarity with other Latino
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naturalization backlogs amount to voter suppression under the guise of
unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud. The heads of the immigration
bureaucracy refer to a breakdown of law and order.
Some groups that protest discrete second wall policies do regularly
entangle themselves in the immigration debate, and when they have turned
to these issues they focus on exposing apparent pretexts. The American Civil
Liberties Union waged a lawsuit challenging a new government practice of
arresting noncitizens at their adjustment of status interviews, which the
ACLU states is “subjecting noncitizens to detention and removal while they
follow the government’s own regulations for obtaining lawful immigration
status based on their marriages to U.S. citizens.”145 The ACLU has taken up
lawsuits on behalf of military recruits impacted by the new intensified
vetting policies and ever-increasing backlogs.146 For those adversely affected
by these policies, resistance also takes the form of support networks, such as
in the case of Hector Barajas-Varela, who founded the Deported Veterans
Support House in Tijuana—an essential oasis for deported veterans.147 The
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
Legal Defense and Education Fund and Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights
and Economic Justice have also challenged the administration’s decisions to
rescind Temporary Protected Status for several countries as
unconstitutionally discriminatory based on race.148 But their actions to
oppose second wall policies are secondary to their advocacy surrounding the
first wall.
C.

STYMIED BY SECOND WALL BARRIERS

What is notable about the select challenges to the second wall is how
they deviate from the comparatively more successful resistance to first wall
immigration policies. They are top-down efforts, driven by elite lawyers and
think tanks rather than bottom-up grass-roots advocacy. They are driven by
issue experts, rather than by broad publics or the immigrants themselves. Of
the handful of pro-immigrant actions bubbling up from communities, most
are uncoordinated and hortatory in nature rather than commanding of public
attention and legal response, excepting the state attorneys general and the
ACLU litigation. For all of their subtlety, the singular intrusions on legal
migration are not well understood. Many of the component policies, such as
the updated guidelines are highly technical and it is not obvious how they
are related to one another or to increased backlogs. They are easily dismissed
as the byproduct of a poorly operating immigration bureaucracy, rather than
a deliberate policy strategy. The singular intrusions on legal migration add
up to a significant policy challenge to immigrants and an even larger
challenge for democracy. Countering this threat to democracy, there needs to
be a broader rethinking of how our immigration bureaucracy operates and is
immigrant rights and civil rights groups on general concerns for racial profiling and discrimination,
cooperation between ICE and police, and protecting due process for immigrants in the removal process.
145. See Jiminez v. Nielsen, No. 1:18-cv-10225-MLW, 2018 WL 910716 (D. Mass. Apr. 10, 2018).
146. See Kuang v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 3:18CV03698 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019).
147. Patrick J. McDonnell, A Home in Tijuana Is a Refuge for Deported U.S. Veterans, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-veterans2017-story.html.
148. See, e.g., Centro Presente v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-10340 (D. Mass. May 9,
2018); NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-239 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2018).
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influenced by broader political mobilization and more pointed legal
accountability.
V.

SCALING THE SECOND WALL

This Essay has argued that, with the exception of a few still-developing
efforts, the second wall response has been inadequate. Our prescriptions for
more effectively resisting second wall policies can be arrayed by ambition:
enhancing individual challenges, expanding political accountability through
structural reform, and building public support through a sanctuary
movement.
A.

ENHANCING INDIVIDUAL CHALLENGES

Private attorneys must continue to act as a necessary check on
government overreach and poor policy decisions. Private immigration
attorneys have previously been and continuously are a check on the
government in general and USCIS in particular. For example, when USCIS
delays an application, attorneys can file a mandamus action in federal court
requesting the court order USCIS to adjudicate the delayed petition either
before an interview pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, or after an interview
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). 149 Attorneys are also able to appeal the denial
of an N-400 Application for Naturalization to an immigration officer using
form N-336, Request for a Hearing on a Decision in Naturalization
Proceedings, or, in cases where USCIS fails to render a decision within 120
days of a naturalization interview, an attorney is able to bring suit in federal
court under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Even if the individual case results are critical,
widespread policy changes are unlikely to result from individual litigation
without precedent-setting impact-litigation.
The profile of private litigation can be amplified with legal actions that
seek to tackle systemic barriers. Impact litigation from experienced
immigrants’ rights organizations is vital. So are the state-sponsored litigation
campaigns of state attorneys general. Already groups such as the ACLU are
challenging the soundness of many second wall policies though large-scale
impact litigation, but this opposition effort must continue and expand. The
ability to affect policy through private litigation will continue to be necessary
to deconstruct the second wall, and moving to impact litigation strategies
raises the stakes and publicity.
Another enhancement to private litigation is the involvement of states.
State and local governments are increasingly pushing back against
restrictionist immigration policies in a manner that resembles the
infrastructure of first wall sanctuary movements. Recently state and localities
have inquired into federal practices that hurt immigrants within their
communities. For example, a letter was signed by mayors of thirty major
cities concerned about the naturalization backlog. Their opposition to these
federal policies is largely hortatory, but they gained attention when a FOIA
149. Federal courts can either (1) conduct a hearing and adjudicate the naturalization application
or (2) remand the matter, with appropriate instructions, to the service to determine. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b)
(1991).
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lawsuit was filed demanding an explanation of agency practices,150 and a
Colorado State Advisory Committee hearing for the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights was conducted to further investigate.151 Though their efforts
pale in comparison to the high-profile lawsuits against the first wall travel
ban and sanctuary cities executive order, they are gaining significance.
Twenty-four attorneys general wrote to the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security in opposition to the changing public charge rule.152 More
lawsuits are expected as the rule is increasingly implemented, including
lawsuits related to USCIS’s compliance with the strict requirements of the
federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.153 State and local governments opposed to
increasingly restrictionist policies have also been updating laws and policies
related to immigration as a general matter, limiting information sharing and
updating guidelines to enhance immigrants’ rights on a range of issues.
While promising, these state attorneys generals’ and mayors’ actions remain
exceptional in the effort to scale the second wall and secondary to the groups
themselves.
B.

EXPANDING POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH STRUCTURAL
REFORM

Recognizing that immigration policies and procedures are in a state of
dysfunction that require fixes that surpasses the capacity of individual
challenges, the structure of policymaking needs to be reformed. This requires
changes to the funding, policies, and practices of the immigration
bureaucracy, as well as revisiting judicial and Congressional oversight.
1. Increased Resources for Administering Immigration Benefits
Initially, in order to increase the ability for USCIS to adjudicate
applications quickly and efficiently, thus reducing or eliminating some of the
massive backlogs that have built up over the last two years, an increase in
USCIS’s budget is necessary. While USCIS has a unique funding structure
that rests 95% of its operations budget on user fees rather than relying on
Congressional appropriations,154 there have been calls to supplement the
user-fees with Congressional appropriations.155 Indeed, there is no indication
that this user-based fee structure was meant to ensure USCIS’ independence
150. Letter from Thirty U.S. Mayors to USCIS (Nov. 10, 2016) (urging Congress to appropriate
funds to reduce the naturalization backlog).
151. Press Release, Colorado Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to
Examine Backlog in Citizenship and Naturalization Applications (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.usccr.gov/press/2019/02-08-PR.pdf. As a matter of disclosure, one of the authors is a
member of the Colorado Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and participated
in this hearing.
152. Letter from 24 Attorneys General to Samantha Deshommes, Chief, Regulatory Coordination
Div. Office of Pol’y and Strategy (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nmag.gov/uploads/PressRelease/
48737699ae174b30ac51a7eb286e661f/AG_Balderas_Leads_Coalition_of_24_Attorneys_General_Dem
anding_President_Trump_and_ICE_Stop_Illegal_Rule_that_Would_Harm_Immigrant_Families.pdf
(demanding President Trump and ICE stop an illegal rule that would harm immigrant families).
153. Evan Weinberger, Trump Immigration Proposal Could Face Credit Reporting Challenge,
BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 28, 2018; 2:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/trumpimmigration-proposal-could-face-credit-reporting-challenge.
154. KANDEL, supra note 4.
155. Letter from U.S. House of Representatives to Francis Cissna, Dir., USCIS (June 29, 2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/N-400_processing_times__Representative_Lofgren.pdf.
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from Congressional oversight, and so appropriations from Congress may
serve the additional purpose of subjecting USCIS to additional institutional
checks. Moreover, in order to limit the ability of USCIS to use these funds,
or the funds that applicants pay, on enforcement operations, any increase in
budget must be accompanied by specific limitations on the budget used for
enforcement efforts. Indeed as one Congressional oversight letter noted,
USCIS has mysteriously requested that some of its funding be reallocated to
ICE enforcement operations while it is struggling to meet its own targets for
reducing backlogs. Under the President’s proposed budget for Fiscal Year
2019, over $200 million would be transferred from USCIS’ user-funded
account to ICE for enforcement operations.156 In order to reduce mission drift
and allow USCIS to refocus itself on effectively and efficiently adjudicating
immigration benefit petitions, this practice must not continue.
Relatedly, USCIS must use funding to hire additional attorneys and staff
for the purpose of serving legal immigrants.157 Beyond increasing funds, the
funds must be earmarked or guided toward mission-enhancing purposes.158
The expanding and sometimes conflicting priorities of the agency to serve
immigrants and police fraud or national security concerns dilute the available
resources for service to immigrants, communication with immigration
attorneys, and benefit adjudications. Agency leadership differs in deciding
how much centralized control to exert over the allocation of resources within
an agency, as opposed to granting localized discretion. As a legal matter,
agencies are typically given considerable latitude over such decisions, and
there are signs that they are exercising that discretion in favor of immigration
enforcement rather than service. Moreover, presidents and their political
appointees have the right to appoint leaders who are responsive to changing
policy priorities who in turn influence civil servant staff. Still, there are
limitations on this political influence given Congress’ setting of the statutory
mission of the agency and constraints imposed by the Administrative
Procedure Act on agency policymaking. Congress’ letter to USCIS
Ombudsman Julie Kirchner suggests that there has been inadequate restraint
on the politicization of the agency.159
2. Streamlining Procedural Burdens
Improving operations in an agency requires continual rethinking of
organizational procedures. Evidence of lapses in the accuracy of immigration
benefit adjudication necessitates such reforms. However, increasing
156. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf.
157. Jason A. Cade, Sanctuary as Equitable Delegation in an Era of Mass Immigration
Enforcement, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 433 (2018) (arguing fees lead to allocating more resources in the U visa
program to promptly adjudicate EAD requests). Cade also explores funding solutions like crowd sourced
platforms, state victims assistance funds, and philanthropic measures.
158. Amanda Frost, Cooperative Enforcement in Immigration Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2017)
(arguing where legalization or adjustment is possible it is a preferred way of reducing the scope and size
of enforcement).
159. Amanda Holpuch, How Trump’s ‘Invisible Wall’ Policies Have Already Curbed Immigration,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/15/invisible-walltrump-policies-have-curbed-immigration (“At least six current and former advisers to Donald Trump,
including Kellyanne Conway and Stephen Miller, have ties to FAIR, which for decades has been working
to drastically curb immigration.”); Letter from U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Members,
supra note 140.
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procedures imposes costs on the agency and the immigrants seeking benefits
in the form of time, money, hassle, and negative dispositions on immigration
benefits. Careful consideration should be given to whether the costs are
justified by the improvements to agency operations and outcomes.
For instance, in the context of new policies related to expedited denials
in the context of requests for evidence, administrative efficiency is being
prioritized over the potential for erroneous denials of applications for
qualifying immigrants. New procedures for issuing notices to appear allow
USCIS to entangle itself with ICE and the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR), focusing on combating fraud and increased enforcement at
the cost of administrative efficiency and independence. New procedures for
calculating unlawful presence seem to stem from the agency’s focus on
maintaining the integrity of the immigration system to the exclusion of any
sort of process. However, the priorities inherent in these kinds of decisions
must be examined closely. USCIS must be mindful of the collateral
consequences these new procedural burdens possess, both for the immigrant
and the agency. Increased scrutiny of applications results in longer
processing times, which in turn leads to further increases in crisis-level
backlogs. Policies aimed at increasing the enforcement power of USCIS
conflict directly with the service-minded, customer service approach of years
past.
3. Restructured Substantive Priorities
Relatedly, USCIS must re-evaluate its substantive priorities and
rebalance the necessity of protecting national security and ensuring the
effective enforcement of the country’s immigration laws with the collateral
effects increased enforcement policies have on lawful immigrants and
would-be citizens. The goals of USCIS must be re-evaluated to reflect the
institution’s policy objectives against the practical consequences of many of
its new policies. USCIS must not lose sight of its Congressional mandate and
be swept up in the influence of restrictionist rhetoric and policies.
Little evidence has been furnished about the need for increased scrutiny
in many of the categories where procedures have been enhanced. No
explanation has been given for why initial determinations no longer require
deference in subsequent agency dispositions. New requirements for
interviews in the adjudication of high-skilled employment visas have led to
backlogs and increased denial rates without evidence that the additional steps
are necessary. There is a lack of information about the presence of national
security risks within the military or from countries of special interest
designated under the CARRP program. There has been no proof of alleged
welfare fraud, voting fraud, immigration benefit fraud, or other harms to
American workers and taxpayers. In the absence of such evidence, it is
unclear whether corresponding backlogs and increased denial rates for
service members and predominantly Muslim immigrants are justified.
There are valid reasons to take seriously national security threats. But it
must be done in a more transparent and fair manner. Additional evidentiary
requirements must be required before subjecting military service members,
refugees, and immigrants from Muslim-majority countries to heightened
scrutiny. Having higher evidentiary burdens serve as a bulwark against
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pretextual findings or racial stereotyping, an issue of concern in cases that
fall under CARRP, as applicants who may only have lived in an area with
high terrorist activity, or who may have a former roommate who has been
classified as a national security threat may find themselves in legal limbo
with no recourse. It will also permit the agency to better discover and
prioritize actual security risks. Vetting for refugees and military service is
already strong. It is not clear why further vetting is needed, and new risks to
the safety of service members and refugees are introduced while they await
the adjudication of their benefits. That is not to say there is not a need to
thoroughly investigate national security threats, but these investigations must
not be merely pretext to implement policies meant only to restrict legal
migration. Further, such new policies must not be immunized from judicial
review by couching substantive changes in procedural language. Changes to
substantive priorities must be done transparently, allowing independent
review of the decision making process. National security threats must be
pursued in a manner that respects due process and balances the risks to
security with risks to other Constitutional values and the rule of law.
In the same way, sweeping changes to prioritize immigrants of merit
must be done thoughtfully, if done at all. The self-sufficiency of immigrants,
the viability of the welfare state, and the soundness of tax dollars are
important to the United States and important to the immigrants who come
here. Still, there are problems associated with broadening definitions of
public charge in a manner that unfairly penalizes immigrants for utilizing
public benefits to which they are lawfully entitled, especially if it is to an
extent that endangers the health and welfare of immigrants and to society in
general. Fraudulent use of public benefits is a fair target for investigation,
but little evidence of that fraud exists and, indeed, many immigrants are
already not entitled to use public benefits. The dangers of potential public
charges must not be overblown, nor the benefits of a heightened public
charge standard inflated. There are real consequences to this new policy that
appear to far exceed any benefits received and dangers countered by it.
Protecting American workers is an important policy goal, and it is one
instantiated in immigration law. The safety of U.S. workers can and should
be prioritized over temporary foreign workers. Still, myopic policies that
erect unnecessary hurdles or unreasonably restrict the types of workers that
may enter the U.S. serve only to harm U.S. companies and, by extension, the
U.S. economy. Uncovering fraud and combating abuse are valid goals, but
new policies must be thoughtfully executed so as to not create more backlogs
and inefficiencies.
4. Increased Institutional Independence and Fidelity to Agency Mission
Finally, USCIS has started to shift away from its original mission of
integration under the Trump administration. In order to maintain the integrity
of the immigration system, USCIS must adhere to its mission of integration
rather than continuing its mission drift towards another enforcement branch
of the Department of Homeland Security.
To this end, the reasoning behind policy decisions must be established to
determine if there is evidence of political motives as pretext for these policy
changes. This administration’s first claims regarding immigration included
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decrying the massive amounts of voter fraud from undocumented individuals
in the 2016 election.160 This led to the creation of a voting integrity
commission that, after providing an extremely flawed report that
demonstrated no voter fraud, was quietly disbanded.161 In the present
scenario, a Congressional investigation could shed light on whether the
alleged fraud that forms the impetus behind many of these policy changes
actually exists, or are merely political motives in disguise. Additional
transparency from USCIS is also needed at a time when internal operations
and policy decisions are leading to massive backlogs, delays, and facially
restrictionist policies. Courts have taken the position that there are limits on
politically-motivated policies in litigation against the rescission of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA), Temporary Protected Status (TPS),
and non-immigration programs that have been found arbitrary and
capricious. Similar principles ought to animate the evaluation of changes in
legal migration.
Finally, USCIS must ensure its fidelity to its statutory mission. While it
is a component of the Department of Homeland Security and has
responsibilities for ensuring the integrity of immigration law, it has a service
mission that is distinct from ICE and CBP. There must be differentiation of
USCIS from ICE within the Department of Homeland Security itself, and
institutional independence between USCIS and EOIR, which were
intentionally separated after the Department of Homeland Security was
reorganized in 2003. By keeping appropriate distance, USCIS may cleanly
stay in its delineated role as the adjudicator of immigration applications, and
not as the enforcer of immigration laws. By keeping its independence from
the EOIR, USCIS will further insulate itself from the enforcement branch of
the Department of Homeland Security while simultaneously helping protect
the independence of the immigration courts.
Additionally, USCIS can support immigration attorneys and community
organizations that provide valuable assistance to immigrants with the
immigration process. Many of these organizations already receive part of
their funding from USCIS, and use this funding to provide such services as
naturalization drives and free or low cost legal assistance. USCIS should
continue to provide such funding and expand rather than retract its support
for immigration attorneys and these community groups with the execution
of its service mission.
C.

BUILDING A SANCTUARY MOVEMENT

In normal times, institutional checks on abuse within the immigration
system would come from within the agency, from Congress, or from intraagency watchdogs. Problematic policies would be challenged in court by
individual or impact litigation. But these are exceptional times. The
traditional overseers and watchmen, are vacating their responsibilities, and
Congress, through inaction, has been complicit or quiescent as the second
wall has been constructed. Where the traditional fire alarms would sound
there is public silence or muted efforts of individual attorneys.
160. See Marina Villeneuve, Report: Trump Commission Did Not Find Widespread Voter Fraud,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 3, 2018), https://apnews.com/f5f6a73b2af546ee97816bb35e82c18d.
161. Id.
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In order to overcome these structural obstacles, public opposition must
be mobilized. Communities with immigrants must be energized and
invigorated. Public opposition to second wall policies will be critical to
limiting their application and ending their practice. Large scale organizing
and grassroots mobilization are imperative in light of the relative lack of
political power of those affected by second wall policies. Experts such as the
NPNA have rallied opposition to the immense naturalization backlog, both
by filing a lawsuit over the causes of the naturalization backlog, and by
organizing in a more traditional sense, even acquiring the support of fifty
mayors of major cities in their efforts to reduce the backlog and delayed
adjudications.162 Policy briefs from AILA have shed light on the recent
failings of USCIS, and sparked Congressional interest in the topic. However,
groups that are resisting these second wall policies must be more connected.
Newcomers to immigration law must be connected with established
networks who have the capacity to confront the invisibility and complexity
of the second wall. Coming together will allow the groups to move beyond
opposing individual policies that harm their constituencies in order to more
effectively tackle the second wall as an overarching construct.
Public pressure will also enhance accountability by allowing
government entities to further investigate the policies that comprise the
second wall. Already the Colorado Advisory Committee to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) is holding public hearings to
investigate the causes and consequences of the naturalization backlog. The
findings it makes about what policies contribute to the backlog and how the
backlog impacts civil rights, voting rights, and the fair administration of
justice could trigger further evaluation of USCIS’ practices toward legal
immigrants. With public exposure, Congress may hold public hearings to
investigate the rationale for these policies and explore solutions. The
information collected through these investigations will assist policy makers,
community groups, and private attorneys alike to scale the second wall.
Understanding that politicians are accountable to their constituencies,
political organizing around immigration policies will be important in
upcoming elections. Without the right to vote, immigrants lack the political
power of many other groups. This makes it imperative that advocacy groups
and individuals join together in placing emphasis on second wall policies
when engaging with elected or campaigning officials. That Congress has the
power to check second wall policies has become easier to see with the change
in political control over the House that has enabled Congress to begin to
utilize some of its oversight authority.
While complex policies and obfuscated practices make scaling the
second wall a challenge, mobilizing can bring visibility to the policies and
translate that seeming disparate policies into social problems that can be
redressed. In this way, second wall policies will be able to tap into the
organizing surrounding first wall practices. Immigration policies have
concrete and rippling effects for society. It is imperative that groups be
equipped to challenge second wall policies by bridging the gap between the
first wall and second wall response.
162.

See Letter from U.S. Mayors, supra note 132.
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CONCLUSION

The legal effects of the second wall prompt Constitutional and statutory
violations, procedural deprivations, and tangible suffering in the form of
denied benefits, intense anxiety, and feelings of exclusion. Being unfairly
judged a national security threat due to being from a Muslim majority
country or refugee leads to social exclusion, unlawful discrimination, and
disregard for the contributions of immigrants and military service members
who serve the U.S. Being unable to obtain a green card due to procedural
hurdles impedes the possibility of immigrants permanently settling in the
U.S. Being long delayed from naturalizing impedes the possibility of
immigrants becoming citizens who can participate fully in society. The
barriers to integration and naturalization for legal immigrants are particularly
problematic because, unlike visa applications and requests for voluntary
waivers, the process for naturalization is provided for in the U.S.
Constitution and is a right, not a privilege granted on a discretionary basis.
Thus, the deprivations of these rights without a reasoned basis infringe on
the command for Congress to provide a uniform rule of naturalization. Also,
the unexplained delays and ever present exposure to the risk of removal or
even denaturalization implicate due process and potentially violate the
Administrative Procedure Act.163
Beyond legal concerns, as a normative concern, jeopardizing legal
immigration means abandoning the historical legacy of the U.S. as a nation
of immigrants, committed to welcoming foreigners rather than excluding
them and promoting equality among them rather than sending an
exclusionary message. It also undermines the quality of citizenship.164 The
threat of endangering legal permanent residence as a path to naturalized
citizenship is that the meaning of citizenship becomes conditional on
arbitrary criteria such as political loyalty, perceived Americanness, and racial
and cultural prerequisites. Moreover, the fear of immigrants and their
advocates of exposure to enforcement that accompanies seeking a benefit
exacerbates the problem. They do not want to defend legal immigrants
because focusing on legal immigrants deflects attention from more dire first
wall policies at the border. These and other chilling effects stymie civic
engagement and societal participation. Also, legal immigrants who have
previously felt secure in their attempts to comply with the law are now afraid
of being swept in to the dragnet and now lie low, preferring to hide in the
shadows of a law that ironically ought to protect them rather than stand up
and fight for inclusion in the way undocumented immigrants have been
willing to do in the absence of alternatives. These changes cumulatively
threaten the rule of law and respect for the immigration system, creating
perverse incentives and sending negative messages to immigrants seeking to
comply with the law and cooperate with the immigration bureaucracy.
Second wall incursions also come at the cost of democratic values and
institutional integrity. As a matter of institutional integrity, these expanded
163. Cf. Solis v. Cissna, Civil Action 9:18-cv-00083 (D.S.C. filed Jan 09, 2018) (delay in VAWA
did not violate APA or due process because it is discretionary).
164. Masha Gessen, Trump’s New War on Immigrants, NEW YORKER (Aug. 10, 2018) (“The
creation of the task force is undoing the naturalization of more than 20 million naturalized citizens in the
American population by taking away their assumption of permanence.”).
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enforcement operations contribute to mission drift and increased
organizational dysfunction of USCIS by taking money from user fees
intended for other more integrative purposes, a reappropriation that is
potentially itself unlawful. The harms to immigrants from denying the
benefits to which they are entitled have already been enumerated. These
challenges to legal migration not only create a problem for immigrants, they
foment civil rights problem for current and future U.S. citizens. Given that
naturalization provides a right to vote, delays and denials of naturalization
generate worrisome consequences for Latino racial and national origin
minorities whose votes have been suppressed before. Enlisting the votes of
newly-naturalized voters might be consequential, even if newly-naturalized
immigrants do not necessarily vote as a block.165 Holding back integration
for legal immigrants means either diluting societal participation or outright
suppressing votes. This is especially true in states with large minority
populations and contested political races.166
Staying silent in the face of legal, normative, and societal threats is costly
to immigrants and citizens alike. Scaling the second wall will require
individual, structural, and public reforms that sound the alarms on the
challenges of legal immigrants.

165. Asian Americans, the fastest-growing minority group with a foreign-born population, show
generally progressive opinion across subethnic groups, with Filipino and Vietnamese voter exceptions.
See CIV. LEADERSHIP USA, 2018 ASIAN AMERICAN VOTER SURVEY 21 (2018), http://www.apiavote.org/
sites/apiavote/files/2018-AA-Voter-Survey-report-Oct9_0.pdf. Latino voters vote overwhelming
Democratic, as well. Polling of Latino voters indicates President Trump and his anti-immigrant
policies have displaced the economy as their primary concern. According to the Pew Research
Center, 75 percent of Latinos have discussed Trump’s anti-Latino behavior and policies with their
friends and families, raising expectations they will vote on these issues in upcoming elections. See
M ARK HUGO LOPEZ, ANA GONZALEZ-BARRERA & JENS MANUEL KROGSTAD, PEW R ESEARCH CTR.:
HISPANIC TRENDS, M ORE LATINOS HAVE SERIOUS C ONCERNS ABOUT THEIR PLACE IN AMERICA
UNDER TRUMP (2018), https://www.pewhispanic.org/2018/10/25/more-latinos-have-serious-concernsabout-their-place-in-america-under-trump/.
166. See Manuel Pastor, Immigrants Applying for Citizenship in High Numbers May Swing the
November Election, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 23, 2016, 12:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/laoe-pastor-voter-registration-rates-of-newly-naturalized-citizens-20160926-snap-story.html (“[I]n a few
key battleground states, the newly naturalized voters we counted could make a difference. In
Florida, they constitute more than 6% of the voting age population. In Nevada, that share is more than
5%; in Virginia, 4%; and in Arizona, 3%. The results in recent general elections in these states have been
so close that these new citizens—if they are registered and turn out—could tip the tallies.”). See also
Manuel Pastor et al., Rock the (Naturalized) Vote II, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
(Sep. 2016), https://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/731/docs/rtnv2016_report_final_v4.pdf; Manuel Pastor,
Rock the (Naturalized) Vote: The Size and Location of the Recently Naturalized Voting Age Citizen
Population, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION (Oct. 2012), https://dornsife.usc.edu/
assets/sites/731/docs/Naturalization_and_Voting_Age_Population_web.pdf.

